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A large, stylized map of the African continent is centered in the background. The map is divided into countries, with the northern and eastern regions shaded in a dark red color, and the southern and western regions shaded in a dark blue color. The map is set against a dark, textured background.

Organised Crime Index

Africa 2019



This project is funded
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Organised Crime Index Africa 2019





Contents

ACRONYMS	4
FIGURES	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	7
1. INTRODUCTION	21
1.1. What is the Organised Crime Index?	22
1.2. How to read the pyramid representations used in this report	24
1.3. The value of the Organised Crime Index	26
2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIMINALITY AND RESILIENCE	31
2.1. Implications of criminality and resilience quadrant analysis	33
3. METHODOLOGY	41
3.1. Model	42
3.2. Benchmark countries	42
3.3. Criminality score	43
3.4. Resilience score	44
3.5. Data collection	44
3.6. Scoring and verification	45
3.7. Expert selection	46
4. CONTINENTAL OVERVIEW AND COUNTRY RANKINGS	49
4.1. Country rankings: Features and dynamics	52
4.2. Intra-Index correlations	63
4.3. Regional summaries	69
4.4. Other continental indices	80
5. CONTINENTAL VULNERABILITIES	85
5.1. Economic vulnerability	87
5.2. Physical, geographic and natural-resource vulnerability	88
5.3. Social cohesion and conflict	89
5.4. Socio-demographic and trade vulnerability	89
5.5. Organised crime and the economy, population and land area	90
6. RESPONSE IMPLICATIONS	95
6.1. Low crime – high resilience	98
6.2. Low crime – low resilience	98
6.3. High crime – high resilience	99
6.4. High crime – low resilience	100
6.5. Criminal actors	100
6.6. Concluding implications	101
7. CONCLUSION	103
8. THE ORGANISED CRIME INDEX WEBSITE	107
8.1. Sort and compare	109
8.2. Country profiles	110
8.3. Make your own comparisons	111
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	112
APPENDIX 1 – DEFINITION OF CRIMINAL MARKETS	114
APPENDIX 2 – RANKING TABLES	117

Acronyms

CITES - Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States

EIU - Economist Intelligence Unit

ENACT - Enhancing Africa's Response to Transnational Organised Crime

FSI - Fragile States Index

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

GI-TOC - Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime

GSI - Global Slavery Index

HDI - Human Development Index

IIAG - Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance

INTERPOL - International Criminal Police Organization

ISS - Institute for Security Studies

IUU FISHING - Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing

ROCO - Regional Organised Crime Observatory

UNTOC - United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

WEF - World Economic Forum

WHO - World Health Organization

Figures

FIGURE 1 - Index components and indicators	9
FIGURE 2 - Continental criminality and resilience	10
FIGURE 3 - Criminality and resilience by region	12
FIGURE 4 - Resilience - continental summary by indicator	13
FIGURE 5 - Mapping criminality and resilience	14
FIGURE 6 - Criminal markets – heatmaps.	16
FIGURE 7 - Criminal actors – score distributions.	18
FIGURE 1.1 - Criminal markets	28
FIGURE 2.1 - Plotting the relationship between criminality and resilience	32
FIGURE 2.2 - Criminality and resilience – country classifications	34
FIGURE 2.3 - Mapping criminality and resilience	35
FIGURE 3.1 - Index scoring process	43
FIGURE 4.1 - Continental averages	51
FIGURE 4.2 - Criminality – highest- and lowest-scoring countries	53
FIGURE 4.3 - Criminal markets – highest- and lowest-scoring countries.	54
FIGURE 4.4 - Criminal actors – highest- and lowest-scoring countries.	55
FIGURE 4.5 - Resilience – highest- and lowest-scoring countries	56
FIGURE 4.6 - Criminal markets – continental averages	57
FIGURE 4.7 - Criminal actors – continental averages.	59
FIGURE 4.8 - Criminal actors – score distributions	61
FIGURE 4.9 - Resilience indicators – continental averages.	62
FIGURE 4.10 - Heroin and cocaine	65
FIGURE 4.11 - Features of criminal actor types	66
FIGURE 4.12 - Index scores by region	69
FIGURE 4.13 - Regional summary – North Africa	70
FIGURE 4.14 - Regional summary – East Africa	73
FIGURE 4.15 - Regional summary – Southern Africa	75
FIGURE 4.16 - Regional summary – West Africa	77
FIGURE 4.17 - Regional summary – Central Africa	79
FIGURE 4.18 - Correlations with other indices	82
FIGURE 5.1 - Vulnerability to organised crime	86
FIGURE 5.2 - Criminality and the size of the economy	91
FIGURE 6.1 - Mapping criminality and resilience	97
FIGURE 6.2 - Criminality and resilience - Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa	99





EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive summary

Introduction

Lives are lost, forests and oceans are pillaged beyond the point of replenishment, animals are slaughtered, women, men, girls and boys are held in situations of violent abuse and exploitation. Customs officials receive bribes to turn their backs to a shipment of drugs. Police officers and soldiers sell their weapons on to street gangs. Politicians accept kickbacks, fix contracts and sell concessions to criminal groups and unethical corporations, so that they can profit from resources that were intended to improve the development opportunities of citizens.

The harms caused by organised crime are widespread and profound. Yet because it is almost always obscured in the 'underworld', hidden in the shadows of remote borderlands, concealed in secrecy jurisdictions or felt most keenly by underserved communities, organised crime is a threat too easily overlooked.

'Organised crime' is not a term that has tended to be used in the African context. However, as the political economy of the continent is evolving and intertwining with other geopolitical and globalisation dynamics, the term is currently being applied to the continent with increasing frequency – and urgency. It describes everything from a range of illicit activities and actors, from human smuggling by militia groups along the North African coast, to the consorts and cronies aligned with heads of state.

This Organised Crime Index is published as an integral part of the EU-funded ENACT programme –Enhancing Africa's Response to Transnational Organised Crime, which is implemented by a consortium comprising the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), INTERPOL and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). ENACT undertakes in-depth research at continental, regional and national levels, publishes studies, policy briefs and short observers to monitor organised-crime trends, and works to engage policymakers, and build the capacity of practitioners and enforcement officials.

The ENACT programme aims to encourage international and regional communities to move away from a solely criminal-justice-led response to organised crime, and towards a more comprehensive package of policies that can help mitigate the impact of organised crime, build local resilience and limit incentives for market participants. The Organised Crime Index is a critical part of this endeavour. Its objective is to catalyse a dialogue, offer a common nomenclature and framework for understanding the challenge, help focus the agenda on urgent priorities and provide guidance on how to respond.

No index could do justice to a topic as complex and multifaceted as organised crime, which encompasses so many forms of illegal and illicit behaviour, with such profound implications. Neither would it be constructive or meaningful as a tool for policymakers and practitioners to present organised crime redacted down to a single number. For that reason, the model we have created is complex, and is based on two leading components: **criminality** and **resilience**.

No state or community experiences organised crime in the same way. They have different vulnerabilities, and different sources of institutional strength. A primary innovation of the ENACT Organised Crime Index, therefore, is to bring the concepts of criminality and resilience together, to offer a model that provides a nuanced picture of criminality, describing ten criminal markets and four criminal actor types, and to parallel that with an assessment of 12 indicators of resilience, forming the pillars of a holistic resilience approach that countries need to respond to organised crime effectively.

FIGURE 1

Index components and indicators

CRIMINALITY	RESILIENCE
CRIMINAL MARKET	NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS
HUMAN TRAFFICKING	INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
HUMAN SMUGGLING	TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
ARMS TRAFFICKING	NON-STATE ACTORS
FLORA CRIMES	LAW ENFORCEMENT
FAUNA CRIMES	POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE
NON-RENEWABLE RESOURCES CRIMES	ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
HEROIN TRADE	ECONOMIC REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
COCAINE TRADE	JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION
CANNABIS TRADE	GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
SYNTHETIC DRUGS TRADE	PREVENTION
CRIMINAL ACTORS	VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT
MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	
CRIMINAL NETWORKS	
STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	
FOREIGN ACTORS	

The Organised Crime Index has been developed through a literature review encompassing more than 3 000 academic articles, some 1 300 policy reports and more than 8 000 news articles. It utilises 49 underlying data sources, and is built on 26 indicators; it is informed by the expertise and input of more than 200 contributors.

Hence, the Index presents a robust, rich effort to describe organised crime, and to create a foundational data and evidence baseline upon which responses can be confidently predicated.




Results

While rankings and individual country dynamics are always of interest – and will become more so as further iterations of the Organised Crime Index allow trends and developments to be documented, analysed and compared longitudinally – for this first version of the Organised Crime Index, it is arguably the continental and regional trends that offer the most in terms of new insight and value.

The key finding of this Index is that, regardless of current levels of criminality, geographic diversity, economics or governance quality, African countries display very low levels of resilience to the threat. The continental average for resilience is only 3.86 out of 10 and, across the continent, no single resilience indicator has a score above 5.00. In every region, the criminality score outstrips the resilience score, in some cases by a considerable and troubling differential.


FIGURE 3
Criminality and resilience by region



An analysis of the resilience scores suggests that while the greatest investment appears to have been made in building up the architecture for responding to organised crime – through national policies and legal frameworks, and by acceding to international conventions – which suggests that some political will is in place, it is weak implementation that undermines country resilience. The criminal justice and security sectors, particularly border control and law enforcement, are the resilience indicators showing the highest scores, whereas victim and witness support, and prevention are negligible to non-existent. It appears that non-state actors are filling gaps in state provision and response, ranking fourth in the resilience indicators.

FIGURE 4


Resilience - continental summary by indicator



By analysing both criminality and resilience levels together, the Index finds 20 African countries – over a third of the continent – in a position of serious vulnerability. These states experience high levels of criminality, but, at the same time, also demonstrate low resilience to counter the threat. These coincide often, but by no means exclusively, with the continent's fragile and conflict states.

FIGURE 5

Mapping criminality and resilience



A significant number of African countries (20 countries, or 37%) find themselves with both low criminality and low resilience – an understandable scenario, as the absence of criminal markets and actors means there is little need to establish specialised units to respond. However, given the versatility of criminal networks globally, monitoring the threat closely and acting to pre-empt a rise in the criminality score would be judicious for such countries.

A notable feature of the combined analysis of criminality and resilience is that only three countries on the continent find themselves with the converse scenario – high criminality and high resilience. These countries – Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria – are the gateways and entrepôts of criminality in Africa, and

while they might appear as countries with strong democratic traditions and institutions, their high ranking in this category highlights the risks that burgeoning organised crime may hold for these socio-economic capitals of the continent. Although their high resilience scores suggest a foundation to build upon, these three countries are arguably more fragile than they might superficially appear, and the broader risks if they should fail to robustly counter criminality means that it is a critical priority for the continent as a whole to understand the dynamics prevalent in these countries.

About 20% of African countries were found to have high resilience to organised crime and demonstrate low levels of criminality, and the countries in this

category are all significant because most lie close to states with serious challenges with organised crime, or have themselves been noted as hubs in the global criminal economy. Ghana, Tunisia, Ethiopia and Botswana all neighbour countries that are in the top ten of the criminality ranking. Rwanda is literally surrounded on all sides by high criminality, low resilience countries, yet it ranks 7th on the resilience index. Cabo Verde faces the challenge of having been a trans-shipment hub in the transnational cocaine trade for decades, yet it comes first in the resilience index. In recent years, Seychelles was noted for being a centre for money laundering and illicit financial flows, yet committed investment has reduced those flows and made it a significant partner in regional maritime security efforts. All of this indicates that the quality of governance and determined political will can produce considerable results, even in the case of weak states.

Criminality in Africa

Examining the aggregated and disaggregated criminality scores in isolation prompts additional insights into the nature and impact of organised crime in Africa, and the Index's heatmaps of the various markets highlight the epicentres of specific crime types, and help visualise the flows of illicit goods and services across the continent. Countries with a broader range of criminal markets are higher up the criminality rankings than those countries with a single but highly pervasive criminal market. Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic, which are the three highest-scoring countries for criminality, each showed the widest breadth of criminal markets.

The highest-scored criminal market continentally is that of **human trafficking** (5.36), a crime found to be ubiquitous across Africa, largely due to the composite nature of the crime category – encompassing crimes ranging from labour and sexual exploitation, to kidnapping for ransom, and forced begging and marriage – activities that reflect cultural practices and low capacity of states to provide security, safety and proper regulation. The crimes of human trafficking, **human smuggling** (4.47), **arms trafficking** (5.24) and the cannabis trade (5.17) were found to be prevalent


in almost every country in Africa, with specific hotspots. Libya and Eritrea stand out for human trafficking; Morocco, Tanzania and Sudan for cannabis production, distribution and use; the neighbouring countries of Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo score the highest for arms trafficking.

Fauna was the second highest ranked market on the continent (5.31), which includes the illegal wildlife trade, and illicit, unregulated and unreported fishing (IUU). The inclusion of marine species made the crime far more prevalent across the continent than if distinct markets for land and sea species had been presented. Other than that, the presence of criminality for environmental commodities – fauna, flora and non-renewable resources – tracked closely to where those resources were to be found. The Democratic Republic of Congo and the central Africa region stand out with high flora-crime scores. The Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Libya and Angola are ranked highest for non-renewable resources, which includes fuel smuggling, as well as illicit mining and trafficking in precious and semi-precious stones, minerals and metals. These markets highlight that criminality has become the next generation 'resource curse' threat, which accompanies states' poor governance of natural resources.

The two high-value drug markets, cocaine and heroin, have the lowest market scores of all ten criminal markets examined in the Index. This is explained by the relatively concentrated flows of these two commodities – heroin down the east African coast, and cocaine along the west African littoral to North Africa. However, where the scores were markedly higher, countries were seen to be grappling with considerable damage created by growing user populations for low-grade heroin – a phenomenon built on the back of transnational trans-shipment, and which has resulted in deaths, violence and corruption. In particular, Mauritius, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa stand out for their high heroin scores and the human and institutional harm that is being caused by this illicit market. As a continental market, synthetic drugs score higher in the Index, reflecting not so much the evidence of a nascent methamphetamine trade, but the burgeoning presence of synthetic opioids that have growing user populations in many countries.

FIGURE 6

Criminal markets – Heatmaps





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
1 10 NO DATA

An innovation of the Index has been to categorise criminal groups in a way that is relevant globally, and to apply it to African criminality, which has rarely been done either in scientific or national law-enforcement analysis. As a consequence, the analysis of criminal actors provided some revealing insights.

While corruption and organised crime have long been understood to go hand in hand, nonetheless it is a standout finding of the Index that state-embedded actors are the most prominent criminal actor types across the continent. In 40 out of the 54 African states, these types of actors were described as having a significant or severe influence on society and state structures. In particular, it is notable that in the higher

bands of criminality scores, it is state-embedded actors that dominate, whereas the influence of mafia-style groups (i.e. territorially based violent actors that are often considered synonymous with organised crime) is almost completely negligible. Instead, it is a combination of state-embedded actors at the higher level of the state, working in conjunction with criminal networks, that are most responsible for driving illicit behaviour and are perceived as causing the greatest harm. Moreover, countries with higher scores for state-embedded actors tend to be authoritarian in nature, with seven of the top ten highest-scoring countries for this category classified as 'authoritarian regimes' by the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2018.

FIGURE 7
Criminal actors – score distributions



The inter-relationship between criminal markets and criminal-actor groups also warrants examination. There is a strong correlation between criminal markets and criminal actors, and 74% of African countries have a higher score for criminal actors

than for criminal markets, which suggests that more systematic research and analysis should be targeted at understanding the actors and networks enabling criminality in Africa.

Conclusion

While it is challenging to draw pithy conclusions from a new dataset that is as rich and complex as this Index, and there is much that has been presented in this report (or which can be mined from a detailed interrogation of the scores and data available on the website), three key issues do stand out from this inaugural effort to quantify organised crime in Africa.


Firstly, the issue requires the level of nuance that the Organised Crime Index presents. The patterns of criminal markets vary sharply across the continent, with differing flows and trends of criminal accumulation. The innovations presented in this Index are, the result of an effort to go beyond just analysing criminal markets, but to also include assessments of criminal actors, and to juxtapose the study of criminality against that of state and other sources of resilience. This offers considerable new insight into understanding the drivers and dynamics of criminality, and provides far more guidance in terms of how to respond to its manifestation.

Secondly, an overemphasis on criminal markets is undermining the quality and efficacy of state responses. Where state-embedded actors are seen as the leading vector in criminality on the continent, investments to reinforce the technical capacity of key state institutions are of limited value, or can even be counter-productive. They will not achieve results because such institutions are undermined, or are captured to protect and facilitate criminality rather than prevent it, reducing a country's resilience rather than enhancing it. In these contexts, a better investment would be in civil society and non-state actors, who are often anyway proving a bulwark against criminality and providing services to those made vulnerable by its impact.

Finally, no strong assumptions can be made about what makes a country resilient. Like locusts drawn to a crop, criminality is attracted to the region's largest economies and longest-standing democracies, and is potent in eroding them. That three states that are engines of the continental economy demonstrate such a breadth of criminality, despite their investment in building up both the general calibre of state institutions and specialised capacities to counter crime, shows how much organised crime contributes to creating and exacerbating state fragility. The Organised Crime Index also reinforces the notion that organised crime collects in situations of conflict and instability, particularly where they intersect with the presence of natural resources, and in doing so protracts the violence, prevents the resolution of conflict and distorts transition processes.

But the picture is by no means hopeless. The Organised Crime Index reveals that, as noted, some of the most resilient states sit amidst or alongside countries demonstrating high levels of crime, and that many countries manage to successfully buffer themselves from the criminality of their neighbours. While the precise relationship between criminality and resilience cannot yet be seen, it is hoped that, over time, the Organised Crime Index will offer a means by which to systematically analyse and better understand these resilience dynamics, and to help policymakers find means to foster them.





Section 1

INTRODUCTION

1 Introduction

1.1 What is the Organised Crime Index?

The ENACT¹ Organised Crime Index is an innovative tool designed to measure levels of organised crime in African countries and assess their resilience to organised-criminal activity. Comprising two composite metrics, the Index ranks countries both according to their levels of **criminality** on a score from 1 to 10 (lowest to highest crime levels) and according to **resilience** to organised crime from 1 to 10 (lowest to highest resilience levels).

This, the first iteration of the Index, which will be updated every two years, includes the 54 countries of Africa²; it therefore serves as a baseline assessment of the continent, while future, expanded versions of the tool will extend the geographic scope, with the intention that it will become a global, comprehensive resource.

This Index provides the most comprehensive, expert-led assessment to date of the pervasiveness of **criminal markets**, the dynamics of **criminal actors**, as well as individual countries' effectiveness in establishing the mechanisms and responses needed to ensure robust resilience to organised crime.

The Organised Crime Index, as an analytical tool, rests on three core parts: the scope, scale and impact of specific criminal markets; the structure and influence of criminal actors; and the extent and capacity of countries' resilience measures against organised crime. These three measures are used to assign each country a criminality score as well as a resilience score.

¹ The ENACT programme (Enhancing Africa's Response to Transnational Organised Crime) is implemented by a consortium comprising the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), INTERPOL and the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC). The programme aims to redirect the focus of the international and regional communities away from a singularly criminal-justice response to organised crime, and towards a complex array of policies that mitigate impact, build local resilience and change incentives for market participants. For more information, visit enactafrica.org

² Only countries officially recognised by the United Nations are included in the Index.

The Index is therefore designed to provide metrics-based information that allows policymakers, practitioners and other stakeholders to be better informed in terms of developing strategies to counter organised crime on the continent.


The Index is therefore designed to provide metrics-based information that allows policymakers, practitioners and other stakeholders to be better informed in terms of developing strategies to counter organised crime on the continent, and worldwide as the Index is continually extended.

The key objectives of the Index are to:


- Provide constructive guidance to policymakers and regional bodies, so that they can prioritise interventions based on a multifaceted assessment of vulnerabilities.
- Catalyse attention to the growing threat presented by transnational crime on the continent.
- Guide responses to organised crime that are not solely criminal-justice- or security-driven but that also address the phenomenon from a socio-economic perspective.
- Provide stakeholders with the means to measure the efficacy of their interventions.
- Promote evidence-based research and analysis to those working directly on policy, with the aim of enhancing regional cooperation and thereby mitigating the impact of organised crime.
- Provide insight into trends nationally and continentally, with future iterations offering a predictive function of organised-crime environments

This report introduces the Index and presents the key findings and implications of the 2018 data. It draws upon a two-year programme by ENACT to develop the tool, and outlines the structure, process, methodology and results. The ENACT programme's network of Regional Organised Crime Observatories (ROCOs) monitor and analyse regional trends in Africa, and act as the information conduits through which the Index is established and built upon.

This report supplements a web-based platform of interactive tools and comparative data through which users are encouraged to further explore the Index and its downloadable data (see ocindex.net).




1.2 How to read the pyramid representations used in this report



1.2.1 Pyramid width and height

The **criminal markets** score is represented by the Pyramid base size and the **criminal actors** score is represented by the Pyramid height on a scale ranging from 1 to 10.




1.2.2 Panel height

The **resilience score** is represented by the Panel height which can be identified by the side of the Panel.


1.2.3 Africa average score

The Pyramid shape represents the **criminality** score, the average between **criminal actors** and **criminal markets**.

The overall **criminality** score for Africa is 5.0. This score is composed by a 4.7 score for **criminal markets**, and 5.3 score for **criminal actors**. The **resilience** score is 3.9.



1.2.4 The Index composition



Criminality indicators

CRIMINAL ACTORS


- ▲ **CA1.** Mafia-Style Groups
- ▲ **CA2.** Criminal Networks
- ▲ **CA3.** State-Embedded Actors
- ▲ **CA4.** Foreign Actors

CRIMINAL MARKETS

- ◆ **CM1.** Human Trafficking
- ◆ **CM2.** Human Smuggling
- ◆ **CM3.** Arms Trafficking
- ◆ **CM4.** Flora Crimes
- ◆ **CM5.** Fauna Crimes
- ◆ **CM6.** Non-Renewable Resources Crimes
- ◆ **CM7.** Heroin Trade
- ◆ **CM8.** Cocaine Trade
- ◆ **CM9.** Cannabis Trade
- ◆ **CM10.** Synthetic Drugs Trade

Resilience indicators

- **R1.** Political Leadership and Governance
- **R2.** Government Transparency and Accountability
- **R3.** International Cooperation
- **R4.** National Policies and Laws
- **R5.** Judicial System and Detention
- **R6.** Law Enforcement
- **R7.** Territorial Integrity
- **R8.** Anti-Money Laundering
- **R9.** Economic Regulatory Environment
- **R10.** Victim and Witness Support
- **R11.** Prevention
- **R12.** Non-State Actors



1.3 The value of the Organised Crime Index

A better evidence basis is needed to allow states and key agencies to more accurately monitor, analyse, prioritise – and more effectively address – the threats posed by organised crime in a measurable, systematic way. Current tools are either designed for use at the national level only, or are limited to specific criminal threats, and consequently do not fully meet the broader needs of policymakers, who are increasingly seeking integrated responses to the organised-crime challenge.

As organised crime continues to grow and morph, transcending borders, and manifesting itself in ways not seen before, responses need to be informed by a holistic, measurable understanding of the phenomenon and its growing, multidimensional impact on society as a whole. This is why a tool such as the Organised Crime Index is a key addition to the existing knowledge base on organised crime by providing a solid foundation of evidence.

While organised crime is widely accepted as a global problem today, until recently there were debates on whether the concept of ‘organised crime’ was applicable to the African states.³ In the past, traditional notions of organised-crime actors did not fit neatly into the African context, which could be characterised as “entrepreneurs” taking advantage of weak governance and instability in order to participate in illicit supply chains. Nevertheless, in recent years, Africa’s growing participation in the global criminal economy, in conjunction with its fast-paced growth in economic, social and technological development, suggests that the continent may feel the impact of organised criminal activities more acutely. By developing the Organised Crime Index, ENACT sheds light on the impact of organised crime on the continent and aims to build networks to combat the threat based on a solid foundation of data and analysis.

Indices are quantitative tools that offer a way to conduct a comparative analysis of complex dynamics – in this case, organised crime. By using the Index, practitioners and policymakers can juxtapose information on criminal markets with other indicators

of performance (such as governance, economics, criminal justice, etc.), and hence develop their responses to organised crime based on empirical data. The Index can also foster awareness and cooperation on a multilateral scale by focusing attention on the growing threat presented by transnational crime on the continent.

The Index incorporates a multi-layered approach around not only the scope and scale of specific illicit flows, but also inherent vulnerabilities and the level and nature of states’ responses. As such, the Index provides policymakers and regional bodies with guidance on how to prioritise interventions based on a multidimensional assessment of where the greatest harms are being felt.

While indices serve as useful tools, their development does not come without challenges. Measuring the concept of organised crime is inherently constrained by its complex nature. Two of the biggest challenges posed by organised crime, particularly in the African context, are the absence of data and the reliability of data that is available. Nevertheless, the Index endeavours to overcome such challenges by cross-checking and triangulating data sources, and by identifying proxy indicators, as needed. Expert-led qualitative assessments also helped provide context and analysis where data offered a limited perspective.

While useful in providing a comparative and innovative analysis of organised crime, it is important for stakeholders to accept the Index as supplementary to other means of gathering information, such as through data generated by organised-crime observatories.

1.3.1 Defining organised crime

An index is a composite measure of variables using various data points. In the context of measuring organised crime, the parameters that the Index relies on are informed by definitions of organised crime and related activities and concepts.

³ Mark Shaw, *Africa’s changing place in the global criminal economy*, ENACT continental report, September 2017.

Organised crime, however, is a notoriously difficult concept to define. Although there is an awareness that the phenomenon exists everywhere, there are multiple forms of crime, enabled by different actors that fluctuate and adapt to various environments. In 2003, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), the principal international instrument against organised crime, came into force, compelling member states to consider defining organised crime. Unable to reach a consensus, however, the UNTOC does not actually provide a definition of organised crime, but rather offers clarity on two constants within the broad context of organised crime. The terms 'organised criminal group' and 'serious offence', outlined in the convention, offer the basic conditions for an activity to be deemed organised crime and the flexibility to address the widest possible range of concerns. For example, an organised criminal group may refer to a broad range of criminal associations, from hierarchal structures to loosely connected networks. Likewise, the convention's focus on the term 'serious offence' ensures a distinction is maintained between low-level criminality and organised-criminal activity. Moreover, the convention specifically speaks to activities that are profit-driven, allowing for policies and responses to distinguish organised crime from politically motivated actions, such as terrorism.

Today the consensus among the convention's member states is increasingly to refrain from definitional debates surrounding the term 'organised crime' and accept that it is flexible, that it refers to a broad spectrum of ever-changing activities and circumstances, and that there are many ways in which the label 'organised crime' can be understood and conceptualised.

Nevertheless, for an index to offer true insight and value, some form of definition is essential. While relying (though not exclusively) on international instruments to define various criminal markets, the Index considers both transnational organised crime, as well organised-criminal activities occurring within state boundaries.

DEFINITION OF ORGANISED CRIME


For the purpose of the Organised Crime Index, 'organised crime' is defined as illegal activities, conducted by groups or networks acting in concert, by engaging in violence, corruption or related activities in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit. Such activities may be carried out both within a country and transnationally.

By defining organised crime in this way, the Index allows for a wide range of activities and perpetrators to be considered and measured. Under the organised crime 'umbrella', the following section offers highlights of the subcomponents of the Organised Crime Index, which will be explained in further detail later in the report.

1.3.2 Criminal markets selected for the Index

While encompassing a range of activities, **criminal markets**, as a subcomponent of the Index’s criminality measure, can be thought of as the political and economic systems surrounding all stages of the illicit trade and/or exploitation of commodities or people.

FIGURE 1.1
Criminal markets



The Appendix at the end of this report contains full definitions of these criminal markets, as used for the purpose of this Index; they are also downloadable from the website (ocindex.net)

Both the forms of organised crime, as well as their depth, are considered by classifying manifestations of crime within these illicit markets, taking into account the African context for this iteration. The intention is that these 10 criminal markets will be expanded in the Index in later years.

In the absence of a universal method to measure each organised crime type across the globe (e.g. through volume of commodities, value of commodities or actors involved), and in the face of data gaps and misinformation, the Index uses an alternative, commodity-driven measurement framework to measure illicit markets by a combination of scope and scale, value and impact. In this way, the Index aims to reconcile the information gaps other frameworks pose.

Together with these criminal markets, the Organised Crime Index measures four types of criminal actors:

- Mafia-style groups;
- Criminal networks;
- State-embedded actors; and
- Foreign criminal actors

These categories are measured for their potency. An outline of each criminal actor type characteristics are in "Section 4.2.3" and on the website.


While acknowledging the wide range of various organised-criminal activities that occur, the Index has restricted its scope to the aforementioned criminal markets in an effort to ensure data availability, minimise information gaps and accurately reflect real-world conditions. However, in future iterations of the Index, an expansion in both geographical coverage and number of criminal markets is envisaged.

Notably, the issue of corruption is not considered in the measurement of the scope and scale of criminal markets. Rather, corruption is reflected in the criminal actors and resilience components. Because criminal markets include a wide range of illicit activities, resilience measures to address them should be far-reaching and multi-sectoral. As such, the Index defines 'resilience' as countries' (including both state and non-state actors) ability to withstand and disrupt organised criminal activities as a whole, rather than individual markets through political, economic, legal and social measures.

Moreover, the Index currently does not consider organised-crime activities that pose jurisdictional problems and/or cross-cutting illicit activities, including illicit financial flows, maritime piracy and cybercrime, among others. Such stateless crimes do not fall neatly into a state-based tool. It is clear, therefore, that there are numerous criminal markets that pose inherent problems when developing an index.







Section 2


RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIMINALITY AND RESILIENCE

2 Relationship between criminality and resilience

Under the Organised Crime Index, states are scored and ranked based on two major components: **criminality** and **resilience**. Although assigning scores is an inherent feature of indices, the approach of the Organised Crime Index is not intended to be judgemental, but rather to facilitate a conversation. The relationship between criminality and resilience is not necessarily linear, so it is important

for stakeholders to move beyond assigned scores and examine more substantively how and why interaction between criminality and resilience exists in their respective countries and regions. The interplay between criminality and the effectiveness of states' responses to that criminality enables users to identify what interventions have worked, those that haven't and areas for improved cooperation.

FIGURE 2.1
Plotting the relationship between criminality and resilience



At first glance, the Index results offer some interesting insights into the role that organised crime plays in Africa. Overall, the continent can be described as having low levels of resilience to organised crime. While only 14 countries were described as having a high resilience to organised crime, 40 countries of the 54 countries in the Index (74%) were described as having limited effective response measures to address organised crime within their borders.

Although these numbers seem daunting, the results do offer a positive qualifier: of the 40 countries that were found to have low resilience, half of them also have low criminality within their borders. This, however, begs the question: why should states that experience low criminality put resilience measures in place for a situation that doesn't exist?

The answer may partly lie in the fact that organised crime evolves with the changing conditions within national and international contexts. Hence, a country with a low organised-crime problem today cannot rule out that a problem will not arise in the future. For countries in this category, the Index offers useful insights into effective resilience measures, including those focused on prevention, as well as criminal actor

and market trends, and even more so with future iterations of the tool.

More troubling are the 20 countries (37% of the continent) that are in the most precarious situation, in other words those identified as having both high criminality and low resilience. In the case of these states, resilience measures are most visibly shown to be either absent or ineffective. States with high criminality and low resilience should identify areas where the impact of organised crime is most felt and why, in order to tackle the underlying conditions and develop targeted response measures.

Yet, regardless of their criminality situations, what the Index results show is that there is a greater need for bolstering response measures against organised crime across the entire continent.

While the need to develop effective response frameworks may be more pressing in states with high criminality, states with low criminality should nevertheless also work to enhance their resilience given the ever-changing nature of organised crime. Indeed, country response measures that focused on preventing organised crime were often scored the lowest, calling for greater attention and development.

2.1 Implications of criminality and resilience quadrant analysis

Turning to 'quadrant-specific' analysis, in presenting scores for levels of organised crime and resilience, the Organised Crime Index data shows that the relationship between criminality and resilience, while negative, is in fact weak. As mentioned above, having a high resilience score does not mean that a country will have low levels of organised crime. Conversely, if a country has low levels of resilience to organised crime, it will not necessarily be afflicted by high levels of organised-criminal activity.

How, then, can we interpret the relationship between criminality and resilience if we cannot assume a direct and linear relationship? Using a quadrant analysis, countries can be categorised into

four broad groups, according to the interrelationship between their criminality and resilience scores:

- Low criminality – high resilience
- Low criminality – low resilience
- High criminality – high resilience
- High criminality – low resilience

The graph above maps the countries included in the Index according to these four classifications. The top-left quadrant contains countries with high resilience and low levels of criminality; the bottom-right quadrant illustrates those countries with the lowest levels of resilience and the highest criminality scores. Countries with high resilience to organised

crime but with high criminality are located in the top-right quadrant; and the countries with low levels of resilience but also low levels of criminality are found in the bottom-left quadrant.

The four quadrants can be thought of as vulnerability classifications, with the least vulnerable countries being those in the top-left quadrant, the

most vulnerable being in the bottom-right quadrant, and the remaining countries in the top-right and bottom-left quadrants.

The figure below presents the classifications for each of the 65 states included in the index (54 African countries and 11 benchmark countries).

FIGURE 2.2


Criminality and resilience – country classifications



* Global benchmark countries used in the research

FIGURE 2.3

Mapping criminality and resilience



Intuitively, one would expect the relationship between the extent of organised crime in a country and that country's resilience to organised crime to be strongly negative. After all, a high degree of resilience to organised crime is likely to result in lower overall levels of organised crime. Indeed, many of the countries with the highest resilience scores – most obviously the global panel countries, including Canada, Singapore and Sweden – also have some of the lowest levels of organised crime, as captured by the criminality score. Conversely, the countries with the lowest resilience scores, for example Somalia, South Sudan, Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo, also have notably high criminality scores.

However, the results illustrate that the relationship is not so clear cut. Two notable exceptions are São Tomé and Príncipe and Nigeria. The former has the lowest criminality score in Africa while simultaneously having relatively low resilience levels; in the case of Nigeria, the converse is true. The statistical correlation


between criminality and resilience is 0.33 (rising marginally to 0.39 when data for the global panel countries is included), which suggests a fairly weak relationship between the two scores. It is, therefore, important to assess the potential reasons for this ambiguous relationship. While the Index results cannot explain causal relationships, analysing the patterns of criminality and resilience can provide useful insights, and help alert stakeholders identify where states need to improve in how they respond to organised crime.

Evidently, those countries in the top-left quadrant, shaded green, are in the most desirable situation. These states have effective resilience measures in place and experience low levels of organised crime. While the low crime–high resilience dynamic may be due to the fact that these countries have always experienced low levels of organised crime, one would hope that it is a consequence of these states building up their resilience over the years in order to reduce organised crime. The majority of the global panel countries are located in this quadrant, all of which are highly developed countries with robust counter-organised-crime frameworks in place.

Furthermore, a number of African states (11 countries) also experience low levels of organised crime, in addition to being resilient to organised crime. The majority of these are small - and, crucially, peaceful - countries. Of the 11 African countries located in this quadrant, seven have not seen conflict within their borders for over 30 years. In fact, the only conflicts involving any of these countries in the last five years are the long-standing conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the internal conflict between the Rwandan government and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, and the episodes of violence involving the so-called Islamic State in Tunisia.

The countries located in the bottom-right quadrant are the most vulnerable to organised crime. They have high levels of criminality and very few to no effective measures to counter it. Ten of the 20 African countries located in this quadrant have overall resilience scores corresponding to non-existent or extremely ineffective regulatory or institutional frameworks. The vast majority of the most vulnerable countries in Africa currently experience, or have experienced in the recent past, civil conflict and unrest, or high security threats.

While the reasoning behind the placement of countries in the most- and least-vulnerable quadrants is relatively straightforward, understanding the organised-crime dynamics in the remaining countries is more challenging. How, for example, can a state have high levels of resilience to organised crime, while simultaneously having high levels of organised criminal activity? Nigeria is a clear example of a country with robust and effective measures and institutions in place to tackle organised crime, but that nevertheless suffers from extremely high levels of organised crime. In the case of some of these countries, it could be that the organised-crime problem is so pervasive that even extensive government efforts to tackle it may not result in its reduction. Were the state to have very limited measures in place to combat organised crime, we may have seen even more severe organised crime levels than already exist. Certain exceptions notwithstanding, they are just that – exceptions. In fact, only five countries, three of which are African, are located in the top-right quadrant, indicating that they have high resilience and, at the same time, high criminality: Albania, Colombia, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.



CASE STUDY

SOUTH AFRICA – HIGH CRIMINALITY–HIGH RESILIENCE

South Africa ranks 10th in Africa for criminality, while simultaneously performing well with regard to resilience (9th on the continent). The criminality score for South Africa reflects the country's diverse array of criminal markets, including well-established drugs markets for heroin and synthetic drugs, in addition to environmental-crime markets for fauna and non-renewable resources. South Africa also has embedded and developed organised-crime groups, including mafia-style gang structures, particularly in Western Cape.

In contrast, South Africa's high resilience score reflects the country's strong legal and institutional frameworks that are able to effectively respond to the organised-crime threat, despite their erosion in recent years. This suggests a potential capacity for the country to respond to organised crime. The standout feature of South Africa's resilience to organised crime is the strength of the country's civil society and non-state actors, which is a key factor in the country's commendable resilience score. Nevertheless, social protection measures, including support for victims and witnesses of organised crime, are very weak in South Africa, indicating a significant scope for improvement.



CASE STUDY

LIBYA – HIGH CRIMINALITY–LOW RESILIENCE

Libya currently finds itself in an extremely precarious situation, with some of the highest levels of organised crime in Africa, compounded by very low resilience, as reflected by the Index scores for the country. As with South Africa, there are a great number of highly pervasive criminal markets that are entrenched in Libya, most notably the exploitation markets of human trafficking and human smuggling, as well as arms trafficking, illicit non-renewable resources and the two drugs markets of cannabis and synthetic drugs. Furthermore, Libya has a diverse array of mafia-style militia groups operating in the country, controlling many areas across the territory and heavily involved in a plethora of criminal markets. However, while organised crime is heavily entrenched in the country, both human smuggling and arms trafficking have seen a decline in recent years due to both internal and external factors.

Engulfed by conflict, the Libyan state is fractured, with essentially two governments in direct competition, both of which have close links to militia groups and other criminal actors. In some cases, they feed off each other, making the political process indirectly dependent on the proceeds of organised crime. As a result, Libya's resilience to organised crime is extremely low, as reflected by the country's poor resilience score. While law enforcement in Libya, which has largely been outsourced to various militias, is moderately effective in some areas, the overwhelming majority of the institutional and regulatory frameworks required to effectively tackle the threat of organised crime are either non-existent or extremely ineffective. While the country remains in conflict and the state continues to be fractured, it is difficult to see a path forward for the country to build up a robust resilience to organised crime.

CASE STUDY

EQUATORIAL GUINEA - LOW CRIMINALITY-LOW RESILIENCE

Equatorial Guinea's Index scores reflect the assessment that there are very few strong criminal actors in the country given the low diversity of criminal markets in which they are able to operate. Indeed, with the exception of the illicit flora market, and to a certain extent the trafficking of non-renewable resources, most criminal markets have very little pertinence in Equatorial Guinea. Corruption is ubiquitous within the state apparatus of the country and Equatorial Guinea's score for state-embedded actors reflects the expert view that it is essentially a criminalised state.

However, while state actors are highly involved in certain criminal markets and profit from corrupt practices, the state as an institution remains weak and fragile. They are completely unable to tackle organised crime, be it with regard to the judicial system and law-enforcement bodies tasked with investigating and prosecuting organised-criminal activity, the economic and financial environment in which corruption is allowed to thrive or social-protection measures. But, as can be seen in the case of many African nations, low resilience does not necessarily mean high levels of organised crime. Criminality is largely a function of the country's integration in global markets, the strength of infrastructure and the presence of resources available for criminal exploitation. As such, it is clear that despite a weak state, plagued with corruption, the conditions for multiple criminal markets to establish themselves in the country are simply not present in Equatorial Guinea.

CASE STUDY

CABO VERDE - LOW CRIMINALITY-HIGH RESILIENCE

Cabo Verde is one of the few African states to experience low levels of organised crime and at the same time have considerably high levels of resilience. The country is politically stable, underpinned by strong democratic institutions and protection of human rights and civic freedoms, which has placed a strong emphasis on tackling organised crime, in particular the trafficking of drugs, most notably cocaine. Cabo Verde has a robust legislative framework, and effective judicial and law-enforcement agencies.

Cocaine trafficking is becoming a major concern in Cabo Verde, however, as the country's location and island status makes it a strategic transshipment and storage point for drugs being trafficked from Latin America to Europe. However, this is just one criminal market and, overall, pervasive criminal markets are rare in the country. The case of Cabo Verde is a reminder that, contrary to common wisdom, being an island state does not condemn a country to widespread organised crime.

More common by a significant margin, on the other hand, are countries with low levels of resilience to organised crime and low levels of criminality in general. As previously mentioned, a significant number of African countries are located in this quadrant, 20 in total (37%). In many cases, weak states are unable to implement effective measures to combat organised crime, but due to numerous economic and geographic factors, organised crime is nevertheless unable to thrive. eSwatini, for example, has a fairly low resilience to organised crime, but also experiences limited criminality. This may be due to the small size of the country, both geographically and economically, which offers few profit-making opportunities to criminal actors. Furthermore, wildlife populations in the country are limited and therefore the potential for criminal activity in the environmental sector is minimal.

Another related explanation, and one that applies to many of the countries in this quadrant, is quite simply that if a state does not experience a marked organised-crime problem, there will be little incentive to invest in the implementation of (or improvement in) counter-organised-crime measures. This, however, leaves such states vulnerable to future organised-criminal activity, which may well come about through a change in circumstances. In other words, countries may not require robust resilience regulatory or institutional frameworks now, but if organised crime does start to spread in future, these countries, such as Equatorial Guinea in the case study above, will find themselves ill-equipped to deal with it.







Section 3

METHODOLOGY

3 Methodology

This is an abridged version of the methodology applied in the research to compile the Index. To read the methodology in full, it is downloadable from the website (ocindex.net), as are the 'Guiding Questions' that were used to assign and justify scores.

3.1 Model

The ENACT Organised Crime Index is modelled on three constituent elements:

- Scope, scale and impact of 10 **criminal markets**
- Structure and influence of four types of **criminal actors**
- Countries' **resilience** to organised crime

These are used to assign each country a criminality score and a resilience score.

3.2 Benchmark countries

In the development and review of the Index, 11 countries outside of Africa were selected as global benchmark states:

GLOBAL BENCHMARK COUNTRIES

ALBANIA	COLOMBIA	MEXICO	THE PHILIPPINES
AUSTRALIA	EL SALVADOR	SINGAPORE	UNITED KINGDOM
CANADA	JAPAN	SWEDEN	

The selection of these benchmark countries is based on the desire to demonstrate a geographically, ethnically and linguistically diverse sample, while taking into consideration the ease with which data can be gathered and the variation of organised-crime activities and priorities in each country. While the first year of the Index provides data and scores for the entire African continent, these 11 additional countries have been selected as global benchmark states in the development and

review of the tool. All experts consulted during the research were instructed to assign scores and/or provide verifications based on global comparisons. In other words, country scores were adjusted to take into account countries across the continent and around the world.

3.3 Criminality score

All countries in the Index are assigned a criminality score, which comprises two subcomponents:


**Prevalence of criminal markets
(including the value and reach of
each market)**

- Value considerations
- Reach considerations (i.e. the non-monetary impact of each market)

**Structure and influence of criminal
actors. Four typologies of criminal
actors have been determined:**


- Mafia-style groups
- Criminal networks
- State-embedded actors
- Foreign criminal actors

FIGURE 3.1
Index scoring process



3.4 Resilience score

While the criminality score allows users to identify the problem and its scale, the resilience score reflects the existence, capacity and effectiveness of country responses to organised crime. Resilience capacity and effectiveness are evaluated in an effort to assess the level at which states have established the appropriate legal, political and strategic frameworks to address organised crime. Under the resilience score, 12 'building blocks' of country resilience to organised crime are identified:



In measuring each resilience indicator, the Index asks two questions:

- Does the resilience measure or framework exist?
- Is the resilience measure or framework effective in combating the organised-crime conditions in the country?

3.5 Data collection

A process of literature review, data creation and collection, analysis and verification was undertaken to determine criminality and resilience scores for each country. ENACT experts developed a number of protocols in order to guide a team of researchers in collecting data on both the value and reach of criminal markets, actor typologies and resilience measures.

Data collection for Africa encountered a number of challenges, including availability, reliability, uniformity and compatibility. ENACT endeavoured to overcome such challenges by cross-checking data sources where available and identifying proxy indicators, as needed.

3.6 Scoring and verification

Drawing on data gathered, expert knowledge and field research, each country was scored for both components of the Index (criminality and resilience), to create a country profile. In parallel, experts in individual criminal markets gave relative scores to all countries in the Index, to ensure that the assessment was comparable.

3.6.1 Scoring thresholds – criminality

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
NON-EXISTENT TO LITTLE INFLUENCE			MODERATE INFLUENCE		SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCE		SEVERE INFLUENCE		

Index scores for both components are based on a scale of 1 to 10. For criminality, a score of 1 signifies the best possible scenario, in which a market or actor group is either non-existent or negligible in their impact; a score of 10 signifies the worst case, in which no aspect of society goes untouched by criminality. For resilience, the inverse applies: highly resilient countries have high scores. All parts of the Index are weighted evenly.

3.6.2 Scoring thresholds – resilience

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
NON-EXISTENT OR EXTREMELY INEFFECTIVE			MODERATELY EFFECTIVE		SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE		HIGHLY EFFECTIVE		

The first round of scores was generated by the ENACT team, based upon their own relevant expertise and the data provided from the data collection stage. The resultant scores and justifications were then verified by external experts by both experts in organised crime at a country level, as well as criminal market experts. A final round of verification took place in a series of regional workshops to ensure that scores were accurate in geographic contexts.

Experts were provided with an overview of the structure and methodology of the Index, the ENACT score, justification and the original data sets, and were asked to justify and substantiate any proposed score changes. Guiding questions and scoring thresholds were provided to standardise the assessment process. (These documents are available on the website, ocindex.net)

3.7 Expert selection


The input provided by nearly 140 independent technical, thematic and geographic expert groups ensures credibility, accountability and transparency of the Index. The experts who were consulted throughout the various stages of producing the Index were selected as representatives from numerous areas of expertise. Broadly speaking, they can be divided into four general groups:

- A technical reference group, who were convened to advise on the practical steps to undertake in the development of the Index tool.
- Experts specialising in the study of organised crime in specific countries.
- Thematic experts specialising in the study or understanding of specific forms of organised crime were consulted during the data-collection, scoring and verification phases.
- A group of external geographic experts with expertise in countries and/or regions of Africa beyond organised crime provided a final review and verification mechanism for the Index scores and justifications.









Section 4

CONTINENTAL OVERVIEW AND COUNTRY RANKINGS

4 Continental overview and country rankings

Africa has experienced unprecedented economic growth and extraordinary advancements in technology and infrastructure. And as such prosperity has undoubtedly helped solidify Africa's role within the global economy, it has, as elsewhere in the world, simultaneously created an environment for organised crime to take hold and expand across the continent.

The growth of criminal networks operating in Africa has at the same time been supported by conflict and instability, weak and corruptible state institutions, as well as criminalised states. As criminal activities and illicit flows move beyond borders, taking advantage of a seamlessly interconnected world, the impact of such activities becomes magnified, enabling organised crime to permeate all areas of African society, from governance and security systems, to culture, national economies and, crucially, citizens' well-being.

Despite indications of the scale of the organised-crime phenomenon, much of what is known (or assumed) about organised-criminal activities in Africa is speculative. What is clear, however, is that by way of its geopolitical location and wealth of natural resources, Africa – as well as having experienced economic and socio-political development – is now home to a range of organised-criminal markets in which a large number of commodities are exchanged illicitly.

The growth of these criminal markets has been driven by macro trends, which have changed Africa's position in the global criminal economy. These include international oversupply of illicit products, most notably increases in drug production in Central Asia and the Andean region, which has, in turn, led to increased volumes of illicit drugs reaching African shores and transiting the continent.




At the same time, its abundance of naturally occurring (and illicitly traded) commodities has also catalysed various criminal economies in Africa, as has the demand for certain products in regions around the world where they are scarce. For example, the appetite for – and price of – environmental commodities has grown, providing strong incentives for criminal actors to engage in the illicit trade in natural African mineral and timber resources, and flora and wildlife (or their parts). Moreover, the aspirations of thousands of Africans on the move in search of a better life elsewhere have accelerated the growth of exploitative and lucrative markets for irregular migration.¹

The growth of criminal networks operating in Africa has at the same time been supported by conflict and instability, weak and corruptible state institutions, as well as criminalised states.

¹ Mark Shaw, *Africa's changing place in the global criminal economy*, 26 September 2017, <https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2017-09-26-enact-continental-report1.pdf>.

FIGURE 4.1

Continental averages



4.7

Using a systematic and informed approach to continent-wide data collection to measure, analyse and respond to these numerous organised-crime challenges, the Organised Crime Index assesses and ranks the 54 countries of the continent in terms of their levels of **criminality** and **resilience** mechanisms to organised crime. Before analysing the results, however, it is important to acknowledge that not all countries start from the same point in terms of comparison and evaluation because of various political, socio-economic, demographic and geographic factors that shape the organised-crime context within each country. For example, geographically larger countries may be inherently more vulnerable to organised crime because they have longer borders to patrol. Therefore, in the comparative analysis of states that follows, it is important to keep in mind such unequal factors.

4.1 Country rankings: Features and dynamics

Although the Index is state-centric in the approach it takes to measurement and analysis, studying a particular country in isolation arguably provides a limited perspective, particularly when organised crime is transnational in nature. Put another way, while the Index enables one to examine specific country circumstances with a view to developing tailor-made responses, it is only when considering the continent-wide context that policymakers and other stakeholders can truly understand the broader picture in terms of the origins, trends and complexity of the organised-crime threat in Africa.

For example, one relationship that the Index foregrounds in Africa is the role that **criminal actors** play in comparison to **criminal markets**. The majority of countries (74%) were assigned higher criminal actor scores than criminal market scores. Indeed, statistical correlations between criminality and resilience show that it is the relationship between criminal actors and state resilience (-0.41) that drives the overall negative correlation.

Under the Index, state-embedded actors were identified as the foremost group responsible for perpetuating organised criminal activities throughout Africa. In 40 out of the 54 African states,

these actors were described as having a significant or severe influence on society and state structures. Moreover, countries with higher state-embedded actors scores tend to be authoritarian in nature, with seven of the top 10 highest-scoring countries for state-embedded actors classified as 'authoritarian regimes' by the Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index 2018.

The importance of criminal actors in perpetrating organised-crime activities in Africa and the prominence of those operating within the state apparatus pose a significant problem. This is particularly true when considered in conjunction with the generally low resilience scores across the continent.

The lower correlation between criminal markets and state resilience might suggest that resilience measures are not particularly effective in combating organised crime present in many African countries. On the other hand, it may be the case that measures aimed at building resilience to organised crime are in fact in place, but the disruptive role played by state-embedded criminal actors is a serious obstacle to effective implementation of such measures. The Index results therefore suggest the need to implement measures that improve government transparency and tackle internal barriers that hamper resilience frameworks.

The Index's national, regional and continental comparisons allow stakeholders to identify similarities and differences in criminality, and to gauge what kinds of responses have been effective in tackling organised crime. Organised crime is global in nature and, in the same way that states must translate their international obligations into national legislation, countries can also draw from their neighbours to develop effective resilience measures within their own borders. This way, the Index aims to encourage inter-state comparison and cooperation.


The Index ranks the 54 African countries by their criminality scores, which were determined during the scoring component of the research (see the Methodology on the website, ocindex.net). The highest country scores signify the most dire crime situation; lower scores represent lower levels of criminality. On a scale of 1 to 10, the African average for criminality is 4.97. Figure 4.2 presents the highest- and lowest-scoring countries.

FIGURE 4.2


Criminality

Highest-scoring countries


Lowest-scoring countries




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NIGERIA
7.70




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DEM. REP. OF CONGO
7.29




#45
COMOROS
3.74




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CABO VERDE
3.74




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CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
6.86




#4
SOMALIA
6.40




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DJIBOUTI
3.73




#48
LESOTHO
3.65




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SOUTH SUDAN
6.40




#6
SUDAN
6.38




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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
3.53




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ESWATINI
3.49




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LIBYA
6.26




#8
CÔTE D'IVOIRE
6.23




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BOTSWANA
3.34




#51
RWANDA
3.34




#9
MALI
6.20



#10
SOUTH AFRICA
6.16



#53
TUNISIA
3.26



#54
SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE
1.88

The Index's criminality rankings are calculated as the simple average of two subcomponents: criminal markets and criminal actors, which, in combination, generate a country's overall criminality score.

When considering criminal markets, the African average is 4.68. Figure 4.3 presents the highest-

and lowest-scoring countries in Africa for criminal markets. The criminal markets score is created by analysing the presence and prevalence of 10 specific organised-crime markets per country, discussed in detail later in this section.

FIGURE 4.3

Criminal markets – highest- and lowest-scoring countries

HIGHEST-SCORING

1.	NIGERIA	7.65
2.	DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	6.45
3.	TANZANIA	6.25
4.	CAMEROON	5.95
4.	CÔTE D'IVOIRE	5.95
6.	LIBYA	5.90
6.	MALI	5.90
8.	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	5.85
9.	SUDAN	5.75
10.	KENYA	5.65

LOWEST-SCORING

45.	SEYCHELLES	3.60
46.	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.55
47.	NAMIBIA	3.50
48.	DJIBOUTI	3.45
49.	TUNISIA	3.40
50.	ESWATINI	3.35
51.	BOTSWANA	3.30
52.	COMOROS	3.10
53.	LESOTHO	3.05
54.	SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	2.00

When looking at the criminal market results, the high criminal market scores for Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo may seem unsurprising, given that these countries are also both ranked at the top of the list for overall criminality. However, as explained above, criminality is measured as an average of two subcomponents, so, for other countries, such as Tanzania, Cameroon and Kenya, their high criminal market scores alone do not mean they are ranked among the highest-scoring countries in terms of overall criminality (for which they were ranked 17th, 13th and 11th, respectively). This would indicate that criminal markets alone do not necessarily play a driving role in organised crime in these countries, and that one also needs to consider the role of influential criminal actors. Indeed, Comoros, which has the third-lowest criminal markets score, is ranked 37th for criminal actors, pushing up its criminality score to a continental ranking of 45th.

High or low criminal market scores can imply a number of things. For example, a low criminality score does not necessarily indicate that a country does not have an organised-crime problem. Rather, a low score may reflect a lack of diversity in criminal markets within a particular country. A country with just one or two criminal commodity markets, for example, that are deemed to have a severely negative impact on society, may have a lower criminality score if the other eight criminal markets measured do not exist within its borders. Conversely, a country that has multiple criminal markets operating within its borders may score higher in overall criminality, even if such markets are only moderately influential. Since criminality analysis considers a combination of several criminal markets, evaluation rests on both the scale and impact of individual markets as well as the diversity of criminal markets prevalent in a country.

As seen in the Comoros example above, the role, structure and influence of various criminal actors can also drive up or down a country's overall criminality score and provide useful insights into

criminality trends across the continent. Figure 4.4 presents the highest- and lowest-scoring countries in Africa for criminal actors. The average score for criminal actors is 5.25.

FIGURE 4.4

Criminal actors – highest- and lowest-scoring countries

HIGHEST-SCORING

1.	DEM. REP. OF CONGO	8.13
2.	SOMALIA	8.00
3.	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	7.88
4.	NIGERIA	7.75
4.	SOUTH SUDAN	7.75
6.	SOUTH AFRICA	7.13
7.	SUDAN	7.00
8.	UGANDA	6.75
9.	LIBYA	6.63
9.	KENYA	6.63

LOWEST-SCORING

42	NAMIBIA	4.13
46	DJIBOUTI	4.00
47	CABO VERDE	3.88
48	MALAWI	3.75
49	ESWATINI	3.63
50	EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.50
51	BOTSWANA	3.38
52	TUNISIA	3.13
53	RWANDA	2.88
54	SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.75

Certain countries, namely Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya, Central African Republic and Sudan, feature in the top ten of the rankings for both criminal markets and criminal actors, which contributes to their overall high criminality scores. At the other end of the rankings, the same is true for São Tomé and Príncipe, Botswana, eSwatini, Tunisia and Equatorial Guinea, which all feature in the ten lowest-scoring countries for criminality. In some countries, however, scores for one subcomponent are considerably higher than for the other, which balances out their overall criminality scores.

The overwhelming trend across Africa is for countries' criminal actor scores to be higher than their criminal market scores. As mentioned, the majority (74%) of African countries have higher criminal actor scores than criminal market scores. Of the five countries with the greatest disparity between the two scores – Somalia, South Sudan, Central African Republic, South Africa and Mauritania – all five have higher criminal actor scores. All of these countries score

uncharacteristically high in the African context for mafia-style groups, given the prominence of militia groups or gangs that engage in a diverse portfolio of organised-criminal activity there. In fact, of the 20 countries with the largest differential between criminal markets and criminal actors, only three – Liberia, Tanzania and the Gambia – are countries where criminal markets are more pervasive than criminal actors.


The Organised Crime Index not only measures levels of criminality, but also provides an assessment of each country's resilience to organised crime. As mentioned earlier in this report, a country's resilience score reflects various facets of resilience to organised crime, including political leadership, criminal justice, security, the financial and economic environment, the role of civil society and levels of social protection (refer to Figure 4.9 below for the 12 indicators of resilience). Figure 4.5 shows the countries that are most and least resilient to organised crime.

FIGURE 4.5


Resilience

Highest-scoring countries


Lowest-scoring countries




#1
CABO VERDE
6.54




#2
MAURITIUS
6.42




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COMOROS
2.50




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ERITREA
2.33




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MOROCCO
6.33




#4
BOTSWANA
6.25




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LIBYA
2.13




#48
CHAD
2.04




#5
SENEGAL
6.04




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ETHIOPIA
6.00




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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
2.04




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DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
1.96




#7
RWANDA
5.75




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5.67




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BURUNDI
1.88




#52
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
1.50




#9
SOUTH AFRICA
5.58



#10
GHANA
5.46



#53
SOUTH SUDAN
1.50



#54
SOMALIA
1.42

The countries that are most resilient to organised crime are geographically dispersed – the top ten places feature countries from all five regions on the continent. Of these ten countries, eight have criminality scores below the continental average. Conversely, the least resilient countries are all in East and Central Africa, with three from the former and five from the latter featuring in the ten lowest-scoring countries for resilience. Of these ten, a total of five countries feature among the ten highest-scoring countries for criminality.

Certain resilience trends can be identified among the top ten highest-scoring countries. Criminal justice measures involving law enforcement and territorial integrity, along with national policies and laws were assessed to be the strongest resilience measures overall, with the majority of the countries scoring no lower than 6. By contrast, victim and witness support measures were deemed to be the weakest among these countries, suggesting national emphasis on ‘harder’ response mechanisms.

Among the lowest-scoring countries for resilience, the overwhelming majority of the resilience indicators are scored no higher than 4. While scores for the highest-scoring countries suggest prioritisation of the role of law enforcement in responding to organised crime, it is under this same indicator where the lowest-scoring countries were assessed to be fairly weak. At the same time, consistent with the highest-scoring countries, and with overall continental trends, these countries scored the lowest in ‘softer’ resilience measures, particularly in the case of prevention responses.

The following sections analyse criminality and resilience from a continental perspective.

4.1.1 Criminal markets

In a breakdown of the ten criminal markets across the continent that were assessed for the Index, Africa’s average criminal market score was 4.68 out of 10. The human-trafficking market scored the highest at 5.36, and the cocaine trade the lowest at 3.40. The various forms of human trafficking on the continent, from forced labour to the recruitment of child soldiers, mean that a large number of criminal activities connected with human trafficking occur in

virtually all areas, including conflict zones and non-conflict-ridden countries alike. The high continental average for human trafficking is primarily a result of this criminal market being established in the vast majority of countries in Africa, in addition to a handful of well-recognised extreme cases of human trafficking, in for example Eritrea, Libya, Nigeria and Sudan. Indeed, 45 of the 54 African countries (83%) have scores of 4 or higher, indicating the widespread reach of this criminal market in every corner of the continent. Furthermore, the non-monetary impact of this market, including its scale in terms of numbers of victims and the levels of violence involved, contributes to the higher than average score.

FIGURE 4.6

Criminal markets – continental averages

CRIMINAL MARKETS	SCORE
HUMAN TRAFFICKING	5.36
FAUNA CRIMES	5.31
NON-RENEWABLE-RESOURCE CRIMES	5.28
ARMS TRAFFICKING	5.24
CANNABIS TRADE	5.17
HUMAN SMUGGLING	4.47
FLORA CRIMES	4.66
SYNTHETIC DRUGS TRADE	4.02
HEROIN TRADE	3.94
COCAINE TRADE	3.40
CRIMINAL MARKETS - CONTINENTAL AVERAGE	4.68

Following human trafficking, certain environmental criminal markets came highest in the rankings – with illicit trade in fauna at 5.31 and non-renewable resources at 5.28. The high scores for these markets are driven by the continent’s biodiversity, geographical concentration of wild fauna and rich reserves of non-renewable resources. Moreover, links between various markets, particularly between types of human trafficking (i.e. forced labour in particular, but also sexual exploitation) and trade in non-renewables, were apparent in country analyses.

Closely following environmental crime, the **arms-trafficking market** scored 5.24 out of 10. The prevalence of arms trafficking, in terms of the overall number of countries affected, contributes to the high continental average. Forty out of the 54 African countries (74%) score 4 or higher for the arms trafficking criminal market. This higher than average score also reflects the arms market's contribution to insecurity and violence, and the way in which illegal firearms are used to perpetrate other organised-crime activities.

The overall criminal market score demonstrates a relatively even distribution, with the mean and median lying at almost the same value in the distribution.

Turning to drug markets, the **cannabis market** had the highest average among the continental drug markets, at 5.17. During the research, cannabis was consistently assessed to be the most widely produced and consumed drug in the majority of countries, regardless of national differences in the legalisation of the cannabis market across the continent. By contrast, higher-value drugs, such as synthetic drugs, heroin and cocaine, had the lowest average scores of all ten criminal markets on the continent. However, it is important to note that these lower averages are due to the concentration of high-value drugs in fewer countries and do not necessarily speak to the level of impact these markets have in the countries where they exist (which may be higher than cannabis). For more nuanced analysis on market reach, the Index offers more country-specific analyses.

Illicit trade in flora and the **human-smuggling** market averaged 4.66 and 4.47, respectively. For human smuggling, the below-average score reflects the freedom of movement across borders afforded to many African nationals when travelling to neighbouring countries. Consequently, human smuggling can be deemed to happen only once victims have left politically granted areas. With regard to illegal trade in protected flora, the relatively low continental average can be explained by the lack of flora species in many African countries, particularly in North Africa, where vast swathes of land are desert.

Looking at the mean scores for each criminal market provides a crucial insight into which markets are the most pervasive in Africa. However, the mean can often obscure key patterns in the criminal markets across the continent, where extremely high or low scores in a few countries may disproportionately affect the continental average. Looking instead at the median values for these markets, therefore, allows users to dig deeper into the continental dynamics. Where there is a significant discrepancy between the mean and the median, this indicates the presence of one or more outliers.

The overall criminal market score demonstrates a relatively even distribution, with the mean and median lying at almost the same value in the distribution. Indeed, there is a fairly even number of countries within each score band in the range of overall scores. This, too, is the case for many of the individual criminal markets, including human smuggling and cannabis, indicating the absence of any extreme outliers.

However, certain criminal markets are dominated by a handful of countries with extremely high scores, most notably the illicit flora market, where the mean of 4.66 is notably higher than the median value of 4.25. Of the 54 African countries

covered, half have scores for the illicit flora market of 4 or lower. These countries tend to be ones that either do not have the natural endowment of flora species required to incentivise criminal activity in the sector or are not geographically positioned in such a way as to make them optimal transit countries for the illicit products. However, there are a handful of countries in which the illicit flora market has a severely detrimental influence, including Equatorial Guinea, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique – all scoring 8.5 or above.

Conversely, the high disparity between the mean and median values for the non-renewables criminal market is due to the pervasiveness of this crime type in the majority of African states, as there is only a minority of countries in which this market has a limited influence. Indeed, half of the countries in Africa score 6 or higher for non-renewable resource crimes, indicating the criminal market's significant influence. It is the small island states in Africa – such as São Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles and Comoros, which score 1 for non-renewables – that lower the mean for this criminal market.

Nevertheless, the discrepancies between the mean and median values for the criminal markets are still relatively minor. The greatest discrepancies are found in the criminal actor typologies.

4.1.2 Criminal actors

FIGURE 4.7

Criminal actors – continental averages

CRIMINAL ACTOR TYPE	SCORE
STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	6.60
CRIMINAL NETWORKS	5.73
FOREIGN CRIMINAL ACTORS	5.56
MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	3.10
CRIMINAL ACTORS - CONTINENTAL AVERAGE	5.25

Turning to criminal actors, the continental average of 5.25 out of 10 signifies that the influence of criminal actors plays a greater role in overall criminality (4.97) than criminal markets, which average 4.68. Of the four criminal-actor typologies used in the Index, state-embedded actors were identified as the foremost group responsible for perpetuating organised-criminal activities throughout Africa, with an average score of 6.60.

Because of the positions of power they wield within the state apparatus, state-embedded criminal actors contribute to a range of criminal activities – from accepting bribes in return for issuing permits, licences and tenders in trade and environmental markets, to directly engaging in organised-criminal activities. The influential 'gatekeeping' state positions such actors hold (from local to national government), as well as high levels of impunity they enjoy, drive up the continental average for this group. Countries with higher scores for state-embedded actors tend to be authoritarian in nature. As previously mentioned, of the top 10 highest-scoring countries for state-embedded actors, seven are classified as 'authoritarian regimes' by the Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index 2018.²

Trailing behind state-embedded actors, criminal networks (5.73) and foreign criminal actors (5.56) were rated as the second and third most prominent criminal groups in the continent. Criminal networks' ability to adapt and change their structure, commodities and trade routes allows such groups to operate in a large number of states, and with varying degrees of control and influence, undermining state security, stability, and social and economic development. Taking advantage of corruption, porous borders and weak rule of law in certain countries – in part due to the role of state-embedded criminal actors there – criminal networks in Africa were regularly described by experts as complex and multidimensional, rather than as monolithic and homogeneous entities. In the Sahel and Sahara, for example, a combination of the regions' enormous expanse and difficult terrain has made the area a fertile location for the movement of illicit commodities by long-standing networks

² South Sudan and Somalia, which both feature in the top ten for state-embedded actors, are not included in the EIU Democracy Index.



linked commercially and socially, and along tribal and community lines, specialising in trade through informal arrangements across the region.

Though categorised for the purposes of the analytical framework of the Organised Crime Index as a single group, foreign criminal actors are actually diverse in terms of their criminal participation across the continent, with representation across the other three typologies. Experts largely identified foreign criminal actors as nationals of neighbouring states. However, actors of Asian origin were regularly highlighted in country assessments, particularly when it comes to activities involving illicit environmental markets (such as the illicit fauna trade, where Asia was consistently identified as a key enabler and primary destination market for a number of wildlife products). In some countries, foreign criminals were described as operating along country peripheries, taking advantage of porous borders and moving commodities between the country in which they operate and their countries of origin, while others, particularly those overlapping with the business or political classes of society, were active and concentrated in countries' capitals. The activities of foreign criminal actors ranged from monopolising single criminal markets, to participating in a wide range of illicit activities.


At the other end of the spectrum, mafia-style organisations were found to be the least robust criminal group, concentrated, as they are, in particular areas of certain countries. Considerably more rigid compared to the structural versatility of criminal networks, mafia-style groups can nevertheless be described as no less violent or influential in terms of the power they exert in areas in which they operate. Indeed, in countries where experts identified a presence of mafia-style organisations (such as in South Africa in the environment drug gangs), assessments showed that they are engaged in multiple criminal markets, from drugs to illicit environmental economies.

While criminal markets scores exhibited relatively even distributions, with the exceptions of the illicit flora and non-renewables markets, the discrepancies between the mean and median for criminal actors are considerably more pronounced, not least for mafia-style groups.

As the least prominent of criminal actor types, no fewer than 18 states, a third of all African countries, registered scores of 1 for mafia-style groups. In fact, this criminal actor typology was identified as having a moderate influence or greater in only 15 of the 54 African countries (28%). The mean average is, however, inflated due to the high scores recorded by the following five countries: Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Libya and Chad. Therefore, the median of 2 is more reflective of the prevalence of mafia-style groups across Africa than the mean, which stands at 3.10. Indeed, only just over a third of the total number of African countries score above 3 for mafia-style groups.

FIGURE 4.8

Criminal actors – score distributions



Similarly, the scores for state-embedded actors are skewed, but towards the higher end of the score range, as opposed to the lower (as is the case with mafia-style groups). The overwhelming majority of African countries have a serious problem with criminal actors embedded within the state apparatus, and this is reflected in the index scores. In 40 of the 54 African states, which represents almost three-quarters of all countries, state-embedded criminal actors have a significant or severe influence on society and state structures, scoring 6 or higher in the index. Conversely, in only six countries on the continent are state-embedded actors thought to have little to no influence, including in São Tomé and Príncipe, Cabo Verde and eSwatini.

4.1.3 Resilience

FIGURE 4.9

Resilience indicators – continental averages

RESILIENCE INDICATORS	SCORE
NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	4.81
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	4.49
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	4.37
NON-STATE ACTORS	4.30
LAW ENFORCEMENT	4.16
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	4.05
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING	3.94
ECONOMIC REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT	3.89
JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	3.77
GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	3.43
PREVENTION	2.69
VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	2.44
RESILIENCE AVERAGE	3.86

In looking at the 12 building blocks of resilience to organised crime, the overall continental average was 3.86 out of 10, notably lower than its criminality average. No single resilience block was marked above 5, suggesting the need for major improvements in response mechanisms to organised crime across the continent.

While each resilience indicator is evaluated independently, natural categories arise that allow for trend analysis. For example, 'political' resilience measures, including political leadership and governance, and government transparency and accountability, varied. Political leadership and governance, which refers to the role a state's government plays in responding to organised crime, averaged higher, with a score of 4.05, than

Laws, treaties and policies may not fully address the real-world organised-crime challenges that countries experience.

government transparency and accountability (3.43). Governments orient citizens toward a state's stance on organised crime, championing its role in combating the phenomenon by laying the foundation to implement action. As such, the political leadership and governance building block may be described as a function of a state's political will to combat organised crime. It is evident in the results for these indicators, however, that generally across Africa, although expressed desire to respond to organised crime may be present, the low degree to which states have ensured transparency in their functions may pose challenges to effective implementation of response measures.

Resilience indicators linked to the legal arena scored highest in the continental averages, with 4.49 for international cooperation, and 4.81 for national policies and laws. Across the continent, countries were identified by experts to have to some degree of structures, policies, legislation or processes of interaction (such as extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties) in place for combating organised crime. Indeed, the UNTOC, for example, has been ratified by the majority of African states (52 out of 54 countries – Somalia and South Sudan being the two outstanding states). Although having such legal measures in place serves as a first step towards implementing action against organised crime, it is in some ways easier to develop such frameworks than to implement them. Moreover, experts on occasion described discrepancies in the scope of state instruments and procedures, and the organised-crime situation states face. In other words, laws, treaties and policies may not fully address the real-world organised-crime challenges that countries experience or they are prevented from doing so owing to other factors, such as limited government transparency.

Another identified trend across Africa is the relatively stronger emphasis on criminal-justice measures to respond to organised crime. As with legal resilience indicators, security-oriented indicators, including law enforcement and territorial integrity had higher scores, with continental averages of 4.16 and 4.37, respectively. Interestingly, states given the highest scores for their ability to control their territory and infrastructure against organised-criminal activities ranged from Algeria

(7.5), the largest country in Africa geographically, to Cabo Verde (7.5), which is small and remote. Eritrea scored high (7.5) because its heavy emphasis on border control. Notably, however, judicial system and detention averaged lower (at 3.77), often because of countries lacking judicial independence or limited resources in a number of countries, as cited by experts.

Economic-focused resilience indicators, including anti-money laundering and economic regulatory environment, scored lower, averaging 3.94 and 3.89, respectively. Relying on Financial Action Task Force recommendations, states' ability to implement legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering and other related threats varied considerably across the continent. Countries such as Ethiopia (7.0), Senegal (6.5) and Cabo Verde (6.5) topped the list, while 22 out of the 54 countries (nearly 41%) scored 3 or below for anti-money laundering (meaning that relevant frameworks are either non-existent or extremely ineffective). Under the economic regulatory environment resilience indicator, which looks at the ability to control, manage and regulate financial and economic transactions, 25 of the 54 countries (46%) scored 3

or below, while ten countries (18.5%) were found to have sufficiently effective frameworks in place.

Finally, with the exception of non-state actors, social-based indicators, such as victim and witness support (2.44) and prevention (2.69) averaged the lowest among all resilience indicators across Africa. Only two countries, Morocco and Mauritius, scored above 5.5 (both averaging 6.0) for their victim and witness programmes, while 17 countries (31%) had no such programmes whatsoever. Prevention programmes across the continent were also limited but more prevalent than victim and witness support, with 14 countries (approximately 26%) scoring 4 or higher.

Non-state actors was found to be a standout social indicator, averaging relatively high among all resilience indicators (4.30). Among the highest-scoring countries are Mauritius, South Africa, Senegal, Benin, Tunisia and Kenya (all with scores of 7). Experts identified active civil-society sectors in these countries engaged with local communities, and a comparatively independent media reporting on organised-criminal activities, and in some cases serving as a check for the state.

4.2 Intra-Index correlations

4.2.1 Component scores

A correlation analysis on all indicators was carried out to assess the strength of the relationships between the various constituents of the index. While correlations between indicators are not indicative of any causal relationships, they do provide interesting insights into the relationship between the numerous dynamics of organised-criminal markets and actors, and the building blocks of resilience.

The **criminal markets** and **criminal actors** scores are both highly correlated with the overall criminality score (0.92 and 0.96, respectively). It is clear, therefore, that both subcomponents are significant and relatively equal drivers of overall criminality. The criminal markets score accounts for approximately 84% of the overall, criminality score, while criminal

actors accounts for 92%. These results lead to the conclusion that, in Africa, policymakers should heighten their focus on the dynamics of criminal actors in order to implement effective responses.

There is a strong, albeit lower, positive correlation between criminal markets and criminal actors (0.77), which suggests that countries with influential organised-criminal actors are likely to have higher levels of organised-criminal activity. Nevertheless, there are exceptions, such as Somalia, for example, where the criminal actors score is the second highest in Africa (8.00), but where the criminal market score lies only marginally above the African average, at 4.80. This may be due to the concentration of criminal activity in few criminal markets in that country, as opposed to the criminal actors having significant reach into a wide range of

criminal markets. It is also indicative of how criminal actors choose to use the profits they generate, which in many cases is channelled into ongoing conflict, terror and corruption.

4.2.2 Criminal markets

Analysing the correlations between the numerous criminal markets allows us to delve into the nature of criminal dynamics across the continent. The highest correlation between markets is that found between human trafficking and human smuggling (0.72). Indeed, the four countries with the highest scores for human trafficking (Libya, Nigeria, Sudan and Eritrea) all have scores of 7 or above for human smuggling. This would seem consistent with global research³ highlighting the vulnerability of people to be exploited while moving irregularly.

Similarly, the correlation between human trafficking and arms trafficking (0.72) is also very strong, indicating a significant link between these two criminal markets. The five countries with the highest arms trafficking scores (Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, Libya and the Central African Republic) all score 7 or higher for human trafficking. As a recent ENACT policy brief concluded, situations of conflict exacerbate any structural or systemic vulnerabilities to human trafficking, while creating opportunities for new forms of human trafficking to arise.⁴ It is clear that for all three criminal markets, countries that are experiencing conflict are those most likely to have higher scores, which is both a reflection of the scale of the market and its impact in contexts when human vulnerability is high and the capacity for oversight is particularly low.

Within the sphere of environmental crime, markets for protected flora and fauna have a moderate positive correlation (0.65). Indeed, several countries with the highest scores for flora-related crime – for example, Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mozambique, Gabon, Republic of Congo and Cameroon – also have significant problems with fauna-related organised crime. However, the relationship between the two

environmental markets is by no means always direct and proportional. Equatorial Guinea, for example, the country recording the highest score for flora, scores only 4 on fauna. Conversely, in South Africa, which scores 8 for fauna, the issue of flora crime is almost non-existent, with a score of only 2. Organised crime involving non-renewables has only weak positive correlation with both flora (0.33) and fauna (0.35), despite falling under the same broad category of environmental crime. However, it is perfectly possible for countries to be rich in mineral resources while simultaneously having low concentrations of flora or fauna species that are vulnerable to exploitation. This is the case in Libya, for example, which scores 8.5 for non-renewables, driven predominantly by the country's illegal oil trade, while having very low scores for flora (1) and fauna (2). Evidently, the levels of crime in the environmental markets correlate with the degree of concentration of exploitable species or natural resources occurring in a particular country.

One of the most interesting aspects of the criminal markets in the Index is the correlation between the four drug markets. For three of the six possible pairs of drug markets – heroin and cocaine; heroin and cannabis; and cocaine and synthetic drugs – there is no statistically significant correlation. For the remaining three, the correlations are both positive and statistically significant. Nevertheless, the correlations are by no means strong. The highest correlation, that found between cocaine and cannabis, is only 0.42, and synthetic drugs have weak correlations with both heroin (0.34) and cannabis (0.37). Overall, these weak correlations suggest that in most countries in Africa, only one or two drug markets have far-reaching impacts. In fact, only Nigeria scores above 6 for all four drug markets. Evidence suggests that due to geographic, economic and cultural differences between countries, markets for particular categories of illicit drugs tend to be predominant in certain regions across Africa. This would seem to be borne out by the fact there are clearly distinct routes and trafficking patterns across the continent. So, for example, countries along the eastern and southern coast of Africa, such as


³ International Organization for Migration (IOM), *World Migration Report 2018*; UNODC, *Global Report on Trafficking of Persons 2018*.

⁴ Lucia Bird and Tuesday Reitano, *Trafficking in persons in conflict contexts: What is a realistic response from Africa*, ENACT, June 2019.

Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa, score among the highest for the heroin market, but have fairly low scores for cocaine. Likewise, cocaine is more predominant in countries near the Gulf of Guinea than other drug types.

FIGURE 4.10

Heroin and cocaine



There are numerous reasons for these regional market variations, the principal being the significant difference between high-value drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, which can be produced in only a limited number of countries around the world, and cannabis, for example, which can be readily grown in many countries. Furthermore, consuming certain drugs may not necessarily have the same cultural taboo associated with it than is the case with others. This also rather strongly debunks the notion that cannabis serves as a so-called gateway drug to more potent illicit substances.


4.2.3 Criminal actors

Index results show that it is predominantly mafia-style groups (0.80) and criminal networks (0.82) that influence the overall criminal actors score. That is to say, countries with a high overall criminal actors score are more likely to have higher scores for mafia-style groups and criminal networks, than for state-embedded actors (0.67) and foreign criminal actors (0.65). Although there are no strong correlations between any of the four-criminal actor typologies, they all – with one exception – have moderately positive correlations. Criminal networks and mafia-style groups have the highest correlation at 0.52. It appears, therefore, that if mafia-style groups have a significant presence in a

country, strong criminal networks are also likely to operate there.

The five countries with the highest scores for mafia-style groups – Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central African Republic, Somalia, Chad and Libya – all score above 6 for criminal networks. The inverse, however, is not necessarily the case. There are many states in Africa that have a strong presence of organised criminal networks, but that nevertheless do not experience the mafia-style organised crime that is seen in many Latin American countries, for example. This is the reality in countries such as Togo, Guinea-Bissau and Côte d'Ivoire, among others, where criminal networks play a prominent role in the organised-crime ecosystem, but where mafia-style groups are either non-existent or play no more than a minor role.

FIGURE 4.11
Features of criminal actor types



Furthermore, there is a moderate positive correlation between criminal networks and state-embedded actors (0.5). While, to a certain extent, all criminal actors take advantage of state corruption, almost universally, criminal networks rely on corruption and state protection to be able to operate successfully, which partly explains the positive correlation between the two.

Similarly, the correlation between criminal networks and foreign criminal actors is 0.48, suggesting a moderately positive relationship between these two criminal-actor types. One factor for this is the fact that criminal networks often collaborate with networks in other countries when carrying out the transaction-based organised-crime activities that characterise this type of actor.

Interestingly, there is no statistically significant relationship between state-embedded actors and foreign criminal actors. This may be due to the presence of two opposing forces. On one hand, it is often the case that countries in which state actors are the strongest actors in organised-criminal activity, in which the state essentially is organised crime, are highly resistant to foreign criminal actors interfering in their country. In other words, they seek to ensure a monopoly over the potential profits deriving from organised crime. This is the case in Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea, for example, which score 9.5 and 9, respectively, for state-embedded actors, but which score only 2.5 and 1.5 for foreign actors, respectively. On the other hand, state-embedded actors and foreign criminal actors may work together, whereby the former facilitate the illicit trade that is controlled by the latter. This is often the case in the environmental crime markets, for example, whereby state-embedded actors offer logging concessions to foreign companies in exchange for bribes.

4.2.4 Resilience

Overall, there are moderate to strong positive correlations between all 12 indicators under the resilience component, lending further credence to the notion that building effective resilience to organised crime requires a multi-sectoral approach to ensure effectiveness. Most indicators have correlations higher than 0.8 with overall resilience, suggesting that, for the most part, each indicator is highly indicative of a country's overall resilience to organised crime. The correlations are lower, although strong nevertheless, between resilience and non-state actors (0.7) and territorial integrity (0.76). This may suggest that it is possible for a country to have high scores for these two indicators while still having a low overall level of resilience, or vice versa. Indeed, these two indicators have the two lowest average correlation coefficients of the 12 resilience indicators, at 0.56 and 0.62, respectively. This implies that both non-state actors and territorial integrity are less likely to mirror country scores for the other indicators.

When it comes to the areas in which states need to take a more proactive role, clear dynamics are observed. For example, there is a strong positive correlation between victim and witness support

and prevention (0.79). Moreover, the non-state actors indicator is relatively highly correlated with government transparency and accountability (0.69), due in part to the crucial role played by civil-society organisations and the media in acting as a check on governments. The lowest correlation between indicators is that between non-state actors and territorial integrity (0.34), which although still positive, illustrates the significant differences between these two indicators in the types of frameworks, policies and actions required by the state to build a robust resilience to organised crime.

4.2.5 Interrelationships between indicators and subcomponents

Looking at correlations between indicators within subcomponents provides crucial insight into the dynamics of different criminal markets, the interactions between the different criminal actor typologies and the interdependencies between the crucial building blocks of resilience to organised crime.

One of the most interesting analyses that can be carried out is the exploration of the relationships between the various criminal actor typologies and the criminal markets. High positive correlations between a specific actor type and a criminal market could indicate that the former plays an important role in the latter. One of the highest positive correlations is the one found between arms trafficking and mafia-style groups (0.65). Indeed, five of the top six highest-scoring countries for mafia-style groups all have arms-trafficking scores of 8.5 or above. This relationship is not surprising, given one of the defining features of a mafia-style group is the capacity to use violence to control territory, and it would be assumed that access to weapons outside of normal channels (i.e. trafficked arms, rather than government stocks) would improve the capacity of a mafia group to exert violent control. A common feature in many of the countries scoring highly on both arms trafficking and mafia-style groups is conflict and civil unrest. Indeed, a major driver of the high scores in both these indicators is the prominence of militia-style groups using various forms of organised-criminal activity to fund their operations.

Additionally, the fauna criminal market has a positive correlation of 0.58 with foreign criminal actors. This relationship supports what the overwhelming majority of research into wildlife crime says, that this market is driven almost entirely by foreign demand. In Madagascar, for example, the score for both fauna-related crime and foreign actors is 8, largely due to the demand for wildlife products fuelled by consumer demand in numerous Asian countries. It is not only foreign demand that drives the high foreign actors score; foreign nationals from East Asia residing in numerous African countries were described by experts to be the kingpins of the illegal wildlife trade within the origin countries.

It is widely acknowledged that organised crime, and perhaps most pertinently, the drug trade, in Africa is not organised in the same way as in countries in Latin America, for example, which are characterised by the involvement of highly organised mafia-style groups.⁵ Many of the transaction-based forms of organised crime in Africa, such as drug trafficking, are instead carried out by loosely organised criminal networks. While the results of the Index suggest this to be the case, the correlations between the four drug markets and criminal networks is not as strong as one may suspect. In fact, there is no statistically significant relationship between criminal networks and the heroin trade. There are, however, statistically significant correlations between criminal networks and cocaine (0.31) and cannabis (0.40), although these are relatively weak. The correlation between criminal networks and synthetic drugs, on the other hand, is slightly higher, positive and moderately strong at 0.47.

For the most part, there are no statistically significant correlations between the criminal markets and resilience indicators. Indeed, when looking at the correlation between the overall criminal markets component with both the resilience indicators and the overall resilience component, they are not statistically significant. There are, however, a few criminal markets that do have a statistically significant negative relationship with most, if not all, of the resilience indicators. Arms trafficking, for example, has negative correlation coefficients ranging from -0.37

to -0.50 with all resilience indicators, the strongest ones being criminal-justice system, law enforcement and territorial integrity. Moreover, human trafficking has similar correlation figures with the resilience indicators. This could suggest that these two criminal markets are the ones that are most likely to thrive in countries where resilience overall is fragile.

Conversely, the correlations between the criminal-actors component and resilience indicators are all negative and statistically significant, with the exception of non-state actors. This relationship is manifestly driven by the strong negative relationship between the resilience indicators and state-embedded actors, for which the average correlation coefficient is -0.47. The strongest correlations are found between state-embedded actors, and political leadership and governance (0.61), international cooperation (0.56) and criminal-justice system (0.55). It is perhaps to be expected that those responsible for building a robust resilience to organised crime, state authorities, are less likely to do so if they themselves are heavily involved in organised-criminal activity. While the component mafia-style groups does also have a statistically significant and negative relationship with almost all resilience indicators, there is no statistically significant relationship between the resilience indicators and criminal networks or foreign actors.

Overall, therefore, while there is a clear relationship between numerous criminal-actor dynamics and a state's resilience to organised crime, and between a limited number of criminal markets and the state-resilience indicators, the relationship between levels of criminality in a country and its resilience to organised crime is by no means strong and unambiguous. Indeed, the correlation between the criminality and resilience components is -0.33, which is a weak negative correlation, albeit statistically significant nevertheless. This indicates that while countries experiencing high levels of organised crime are in fact more likely to have lower levels of resilience to organised crime, it is nevertheless perfectly plausible for a country to have either a high criminality score and a high resilience score, or a low score for both components.

⁵ Julia Bello-Schünemann and Lily Welborn, *Responding to drug demand in West Africa*, ISS, August 2019.

4.3 Regional summaries

While the Organised Crime Index provides a continental overview of **criminality** and **resilience** trends across Africa, the tool also allows for geographic disaggregation, offering users more nuanced perspectives of regions and countries for comparison and analysis.




FIGURE 4.12
Index scores by region

REGION	CRIMINALITY SCORE	CRIMINAL MARKETS SCORE	CRIMINAL ACTORS SCORE	RESILIENCE SCORE
EAST AFRICA	5.51	4.96	6.06	3.50
WEST AFRICA	5.29	5.22	5.35	4.26
CENTRAL AFRICA	4.85	4.63	5.08	2.95
NORTH AFRICA	4.73	4.41	5.04	4.19
SOUTHERN AFRICA	4.44	4.05	4.82	4.27
AFRICAN AVERAGE	4.97	4.68	5.25	3.86

When looking at the five regions in Africa, the Index offers some interesting insight into geographic dynamics. For example, East and West Africa were consistently noted as exhibiting the highest levels of criminality, with both ranking either first or second among all regions. East Africa leads the continent in both overall criminality (averaging 5.51) and criminal actors (6.06), while West Africa has the highest criminal market score of all regions (5.22). At the other end of the spectrum, Southern Africa has the lowest criminality scores across the board, with an overall criminality average of 4.44, a criminal-markets average of 4.05 and a criminal-actors average of 4.82.

Southern Africa also exhibits the highest resilience of the continent's regions, averaging 4.27. Central Africa has the lowest resilience to organised crime on the continent, with an average of 2.95. For more detailed analysis, the following sections highlight notable regional trends, efforts and concerns identified by the Index.

East Africa leads the continent in both overall criminality (averaging 5.51) and criminal actors (6.06).

4.3.1 North Africa




FIGURE 4.13
Regional summary – North Africa

COUNTRY	CRIMINALITY SCORE	CRIMINAL MARKETS SCORE	CRIMINAL ACTORS SCORE	RESILIENCE SCORE
ALGERIA	4.21	4.30	4.13	4.75
EGYPT	5.14	4.65	5.63	3.96
LIBYA	6.26	5.90	6.63	2.13
MAURITANIA	4.60	3.70	5.50	2.67
MOROCCO	4.88	4.50	5.25	6.33
TUNISIA	3.26	3.40	3.13	5.29

North Africa, comprising six countries, scores below the African average for criminality (4.97), with a regional criminality average of 4.73 out of 10. In line with the rest of the continent, criminal actors in this region drive the criminality score up, with a score of 5.04, compared to criminal markets (4.41). When looking at each of the criminality components individually, both criminal markets and criminal actors are below the continental averages (4.68 and 5.25, respectively), suggesting perhaps a more limited distribution of the criminality typologies than found in other regions.

Given North Africa's geopolitical location, drugs and exploitative markets were found to be far more prevalent than illicit environmental markets. The cannabis market was singled out as the most prominent of the regional illicit economies, with a regional average of 6.75. This was assessed to be the result of major producer countries in the region (i.e. Morocco, designated as one of the largest cannabis-producing countries in the world⁶), as well as widespread consumption in the region, particularly among youth populations. Both human trafficking and human smuggling average at 5.75 – explained by the fact the region serves as a well-known transit hotspot for European destination markets across the Mediterranean Sea.

The synthetic-drugs market was noted as growing, with a regional average of 5.17, particularly for drugs such as tramadol. The illicit trade in non-renewable resources – particularly oil in states such as Libya and Algeria – drives up the regional average of the market to 4.75, although this market scores significantly less than the continental average of 5.28, where other regions are recognised as having more diverse and higher-impact natural-resource markets (such as minerals and gold, where illegally controlled mining operations often involve more exploitative practices and result in greater environmental damage).

Fauna and flora, as well as high-value drugs, including cocaine and heroin, were identified as the least prevalent (and therefore lowest-scoring) markets in the region. The harsh climate of the

Sahara offers little in the way of biodiversity (for both wildlife and plant species), while high-value drug markets were identified as too expensive for widespread distribution and consumption, and are suppressed by strict cultural taboos.


Criminal actors operating in the region entail primarily state-embedded actors (6.83) and criminal networks (5.33), while the presence of mafia-style groups is minimal (3.33), consistent with continental trends. Strong state structures were consistently highlighted in expert assessments and, in some cases (i.e. Libya), militias engaging in illicit activities were identified as stepping into de facto government roles. Foreign criminal actors are found to play a significant role in exploitative criminal markets (e.g. human trafficking and smuggling), explained by the fact that sub-Saharan actors are responsible for moving people into the region who are en route for Europe.

The cannabis market was singled out as the most prominent of the regional illicit economies, with a regional average of 6.75.

When it comes to resilience measures against organised crime, the region is characterised as placing an emphasis on criminal-justice measures at the expense of social-response frameworks. National policies and laws (5.08), law enforcement (5.17) and territorial integrity (5.25) were identified as the top three strongest resilience areas, in line with the highly militarised state role consistently noted in the region. By contrast, government transparency and accountability (3.75), victim and witness support (3.00) and organised crime prevention measures (2.92) are among the least developed and therefore least effective resilience areas, reinforcing assessments on the heavy regional emphasis on security at the expense of 'softer' resilience measures.

⁶ See UNODC World Drug Report 2019, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2019/June/world-drug-report-2019_-35-million-people-worldwide-suffer-from-drug-use-disorders-while-only-1-in-7-people-receive-treatment.html.

4.3.2 East Africa



In terms of resilience, East Africa is overall the second least resilient region, with an average resilience score of 3.50.

Among the nine countries that make up the East African region, strong trends were identified in both criminal markets and actors, as well as resilience. The region averages higher in terms of criminality (5.51) than the rest of the continent (4.97), with criminal markets at 4.96 (compared to Africa's 4.68) and actors at 6.06 (where Africa averages an overall 5.25).

In terms of markets, arms trafficking was identified as the most prominent illicit economy, at 6.78, a marked contrast with the least prominent market, cocaine, at 2.61. Somalia and Sudan both score 9.00 in arms trafficking, the highest score in Africa. Following arms, human trafficking (6.61) and human smuggling (6.22) were found to be the second and third most prevalent criminal markets, primarily due to the region's position as a transit zone for the movement of people to the Gulf states as well as through Egypt en route to Europe. Indeed, countries such as Sudan and Eritrea score among the highest

in Africa, with 8.50 for human trafficking and 8.00 for smuggling, driving up scores for the exploitative markets in the region.

As with other regions, cannabis is by far the most prevalent drug market, with an average of 5.61 (above the continental average of 5.17); this value is high compared to higher-value drugs, including heroin (3.89), synthetic drugs (2.94) and cocaine (2.61).

In terms of environmental crimes, fauna trafficking (5.17), the illicit trade in non-renewable resources (5.17), driven predominantly by the illegal regional trade in charcoal, and flora (4.56) have similar regional averages.

Like the North African region, state-embedded actors (7.00) and criminal networks (6.56) dominate the region's criminal activities. Foreign actors (6.33) come in third, with Sudan (7.5), South Sudan (8.00) and Uganda (7.5) driving up scores in part due to the involvement of foreign nationals (often from within the region) involved in weapons sales and procurement, human trafficking and wildlife crimes. Mafia-style actors average 4.33 in the region, as experts identified several militia groups engaged in organised-crime activities.

In terms of resilience, East Africa is overall the second least resilient region (after Central Africa), with an average resilience score of 3.50, compared

to the African average of 3.86. As is the case with North Africa, resilience measures in countries in this region are focused primarily on heavy security frameworks, at the expense of softer response mechanisms. National policies and laws were noted as the strongest among resilience measures (averaging regionally at a 4.56), though experts identified consistency issues in implementation. Likewise, territorial integrity (4.39) and international cooperation (4.17) score among the highest in terms of existing measures and efficacy. Notably, however, countries in the region differ markedly from one another in their commitment to international engagement. For example, while Djibouti scores 7.5 (the highest in the region) for its ratification of eight organised-crime-related international conventions and for its involvement in regional networks to combat wildlife trafficking, Somalia scores 1.00, having yet to ratify UNTOC and its protocols.


Prevention, and government transparency and accountability were described as weak throughout the region (averaging 2.44 and 2.61, respectively), with the notable exception of Ethiopia, which scores 6.5 for government transparency and accountability. Support for victims of organised crime and protection for witnesses are virtually non-existent in the region, with an average of 1.78.

FIGURE 4.14

Regional summary – East Africa

COUNTRY	CRIMINALITY SCORE	CRIMINAL MARKETS SCORE	CRIMINAL ACTORS SCORE	RESILIENCE SCORE
DJIBOUTI	3.73	3.45	4.00	4.67
ERITREA	4.26	3.90	4.63	2.33
ETHIOPIA	4.58	4.40	4.75	6.00
KENYA	6.14	5.65	6.63	5.04
SOMALIA	6.40	4.80	8.00	1.42
SOUTH SUDAN	6.40	5.05	7.75	1.50
SUDAN	6.38	5.75	7.00	2.83
TANZANIA	5.63	6.25	5.00	4.13
UGANDA	6.05	5.35	6.75	3.63

4.3.3 Southern Africa



Southern Africa, comprising 13 countries, was found to be the lowest-scoring region for criminality, with overall criminality (4.4), criminal market (4.05) and criminal actor (4.82) scores consistently falling below the rest of the continent. In terms of criminal markets, the illicit trade in fauna scores the highest (5.69), indicating that to be the most pervasive illicit market in the region. This is understandable: the region is home to large concentrations of sought after mega-fauna and is known for its biodiversity. Following trade in fauna, the heroin market was identified as the

most pervasive illicit economy in the region (with an average of 4.88). The volume of heroin shipped from Central Asia to this region has increased in recent years, reshaping criminal governance systems and transforming the region into both a significant transit zone and consumption market.⁷

The illicit trade in non-renewable resources (4.46), flora (4.19) and the cannabis market (4.19) also average relatively high in this region. The region is a source market for a number of precious stones (including

⁷ See Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow and Mark Shaw, *The heroin coast: A political economy along the eastern African seaboard*, 2018, <https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2018-06-27-research-paper-heroin-coast-pdf.pdf>.

diamonds, rubies and garnets, among others) and is known for a substantial illicit economy surrounding artisanal gold mining. With destination markets in Asia, experts highlighted the illegal non-renewables market as both resulting in major economic loss for states in the region and as being significantly detrimental to the natural environment, as seen in Mozambique for example. The region was also identified as a global producer of high-value timber bound for Asia, with illicit logging significantly contributing to deforestation. While cannabis is regularly highlighted as the standout illicit market throughout Africa, the legalisation of the drug in countries in the region, including South Africa and Zimbabwe, drives the regional average down for this market.

Unlike the North and East Africa regions, Southern African countries fare comparatively low in terms of exploitative markets: human trafficking (4.08) and human smuggling (3.12). Furthermore, arms trafficking has a regional average of 3.88. While experts acknowledged the region's increasingly important markets for drugs like cocaine (2.50) and synthetic drugs (3.54), these are eclipsed by the heroin and cannabis markets, which average 4.88 and 4.19, respectively.

In terms of criminal actors, the region differs from other parts of the continent, with foreign criminal

actors assessed as the most influential among criminal groups in the region (5.88), followed by state-embedded actors (5.65) and criminal networks (5.12). The prevalence and ubiquity of foreign criminal actors was regularly described by experts, with varying degrees of control in specific illicit activities, most notably the environmental markets. In this region, mafia-style actors (2.62) are the least influential of such groups.


Southern African countries were also identified as the highest scoring of all regions in terms of resilience to organised crime, with an average of 4.27 (compared to the continental average of 3.86). Overall, the region was deemed to be relatively strong in a number of legal and criminal-justice areas. Indicators such as judicial system and detention (4.27) average the highest on the continent owing to higher levels of independence in regional judiciaries, though capacity limitations were identified. A notable trend in the region is the importance placed on non-state actors, with civil society and the media in the region being well funded and among the most active across Africa, particularly in Mauritius, South Africa and Botswana. Consistent with continental trends, however, both prevention (2.88) and victim and witness support (2.77) score the lowest, compared to continental averages 2.69 and 2.44, respectively.

FIGURE 4.15

Regional summary – Southern Africa

COUNTRY	CRIMINALITY SCORE	CRIMINAL MARKETS SCORE	CRIMINAL ACTORS SCORE	RESILIENCE SCORE
BOTSWANA	3.34	3.30	3.38	6.25
COMOROS	3.74	3.10	4.38	2.50
ESWATINI	3.49	3.35	3.63	2.96
LESOTHO	3.65	3.05	4.25	3.58
MADAGASCAR	5.38	5.00	5.75	3.25
MALAWI	3.88	4.00	3.75	4.38
MAURITIUS	4.16	3.95	4.38	6.42
MOZAMBIQUE	5.86	5.35	6.38	2.83
NAMIBIA	3.81	3.50	4.13	5.04
SEYCHELLES	3.93	3.60	4.25	5.38
SOUTH AFRICA	6.16	5.20	7.13	5.58
ZAMBIA	4.86	4.60	5.13	3.96
ZIMBABWE	5.41	4.70	6.13	3.33

4.3.4 West Africa



Criminality in West Africa is the second highest on the continent (after East Africa), with a regional average of 5.29. As with other regions, criminal actors (5.35) marginally drive up the criminality score for West Africa, compared to criminal markets (5.22). Notably, however, criminal markets were identified as the most pervasive in Africa, in part due to the diversity of illicit activities found throughout the region.

Despite West Africa's high criminality score, experts described the region as relatively resilient to organised crime, with an average of 4.26 (the most resilient region after Southern Africa). Exhibiting high

criminality and high resilience scores suggests both a wide variation in pervasiveness and criminality among individual countries in the region, as well as inherent vulnerabilities that may not be helped by resilience measures. Moreover, the efficacy of higher resilience measures may be more clearly witnessed with future iterations of the Index.

In the criminal-markets subcomponent, illicit environmental markets top the list, with scores of 6.00 for illicit trade in non-renewable resources, 5.73 for flora-related crimes and 5.53 for the fauna market. Non-renewables and flora markets were described

as often being linked, in that the rise and fall of prices for certain natural-resource commodities (such as oil), inevitably affect the degree of illicit logging. Moreover, illicit activities surrounding gold production are significant in the region, with increasing insecurity and unsafe conditions around gold mines, and links between the industry and local livelihoods, criminality and corruption. Similarly, the illicit trade in pangolins (among other species), and their resulting status as critically endangered, drives up the fauna average score.

Of the drug markets, cannabis averaged the highest in the region (5.70) compared to other drugs – cocaine (5.20), synthetic drugs (4.80) and heroin (4.23), which is in line with continental trends. While standout countries, such as Nigeria, were noted as major producers for destination markets abroad, cannabis cultivation was described as generally increasing in the region, along with a growing domestic consumption market.

Human smuggling is the lowest scored market in the region (4.23), due to the freedom of cross-border movement afforded to West African nationals under ECOWAS. The smuggling of persons requires movement in contravention of national laws, hence

little smuggling occurs in the region. Experts therefore attributed the market's score to smuggling of persons outside of the ECOWAS bloc and onward to the Sahel and North Africa.

In terms of criminal actors, state-embedded actors (6.73) average the highest, with Mali, Guinea and Niger identified as the most influenced by such actors engaging in illicit activities. State-embedded actors were closely followed by criminal networks (6.40), foreign criminal actors (5.83) and mafia-style groups (2.43).


West Africa's resilience score is driven primarily by non-state actors (5.40), which are active, and focus on a wide range of organised-crime-related issues. International cooperation (5.33) was identified as the second highest resilience indicator and the best across Africa, in large part due to the success of ECOWAS as a regional economic community. Interestingly, even though state-embedded criminal actors average the highest among criminal groups, both political leadership and governance (4.33), and government transparency and accountability (4.00) were assessed as more effective than the continental averages of 4.05 and 3.43, respectively.

FIGURE 4.16

Regional summary – West Africa

COUNTRY	CRIMINALITY SCORE	CRIMINAL MARKETS SCORE	CRIMINAL ACTORS SCORE	RESILIENCE SCORE
BENIN	4.83	5.15	4.50	4.33
BURKINA FASO	4.98	4.95	5.00	3.88
CABO VERDE	3.74	3.60	3.88	6.54
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.23	5.95	6.50	4.54
GAMBIA	4.61	5.10	4.13	4.63
GHANA	4.89	5.15	4.63	5.46
GUINEA	5.39	5.15	5.63	2.75
GUINEA-BISSAU	4.99	4.35	5.63	2.67
LIBERIA	4.84	5.55	4.13	3.83
MALI	6.20	5.90	6.50	2.63
NIGER	5.74	5.35	6.13	3.54
NIGERIA	7.70	7.65	7.75	5.67
SENEGAL	4.60	4.45	4.75	6.04
SIERRA LEONE	5.00	5.00	5.00	3.33
TOGO	5.56	5.00	6.13	4.04

4.3.5 Central Africa



Central Africa, comprising 11 countries, has a criminality score of 4.85, below the continental average of 4.97. In line with other regions, criminal actors marginally drive up the criminality average, with a score of 5.08, compared to criminal markets, at 4.63. When looking at the criminality components individually, both criminal markets and actors fall below the continental averages (4.68 and 5.25 respectively), suggesting perhaps a more limited distribution of criminality typologies than experienced in other regions. In the context of prolonged conflict and vast biodiversity in many countries in Central Africa, arms trafficking and

environmental markets were described as far more prevalent than drug economies.

Indeed, arms trafficking can be singled out as the most prominent of the region's criminal markets, with an average of 5.91. Experts noted a high demand for and illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons resulting from separatist insurgencies and other sub-regional conflicts. Countries that were assessed as stable and conflict-free have nevertheless been exposed to the illicit trade in weapons from neighbouring countries in conflict, driving up the regional average.

Flora-related crimes (5.68), the illicit trade in non-renewable resources (5.64) and fauna (5.59) were identified as the second, third and fourth most prominent criminal markets in Central Africa. These markets were noted as strongly linked to armed actors as well as to state officials and a significant foreign criminal presence. Illicit logging was often noted as resulting in severe deforestation in a number of countries, predominantly those in the Congo Basin region, with timber bound for neighbouring and Asian markets.⁸

In terms of wildlife, the region was described by experts as a source and transit zone for a number of endangered species, including elephants, birds, fish and reptiles. Meanwhile, poaching has resulted in a number of species' extinction (particularly rhinos in certain countries). Poaching activities are linked to a range of actors, and animal parts are supplied for bushmeat and traditional medicine.

Finally, the region is a major producer of minerals and natural resources, from oil to diamonds. This market was noted for the wide range of criminal actors involved, from state actors to criminal and foreign networks. Notably, state-embedded actors averaged

7.09, the highest in Africa, driven by extremely high scores in Equatorial Guinea, Angola and Burundi, followed by criminal networks (5.09) and foreign actors (4.68). Mafia-style groups continue to show minimal influence, in line with continental trends.

Unfortunately, perhaps the most notable trend observable in the Central African region is the fragility or absence of resilience measures to organised crime. The region's resilience average of 2.95 is the lowest on the continent, with every resilience indicator achieving the lowest average score of all five regions in Africa, with the exception of victim and witness support. Among the strongest of areas, national policies and laws average (4.18), with notable efforts by countries to develop legislation surrounding certain markets (i.e. fauna). Victim and witness support is the lowest resilience indicator (1.86), and assessed as nearly non-existent in the region.

Experts noted a high demand for and illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons resulting from separatist insurgencies and other sub-regional conflicts.

FIGURE 4.17

Regional summary – Central Africa

COUNTRY	CRIMINALITY SCORE	CRIMINAL MARKETS SCORE	CRIMINAL ACTORS SCORE	RESILIENCE SCORE
ANGOLA	4.78	4.55	5.00	4.33
BURUNDI	4.39	4.40	4.38	1.88
CAMEROON	5.98	5.95	6.00	3.33
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	6.86	5.85	7.88	1.50
CHAD	5.84	5.05	6.63	2.04
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	7.29	6.45	8.13	1.96
EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.53	3.55	3.50	2.04
GABON	4.68	4.85	4.50	2.71
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	4.85	4.45	5.25	3.08
RWANDA	3.34	3.80	2.88	5.75
SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.88	2.00	1.75	3.79

⁸ ENACT, *Razing Africa: Combatting criminal consortia in the logging sector*, September 2018.



4.4 Other continental indices

While the ENACT Organised Crime Index is unique in its scope and comprehensiveness, resilience and criminality are also measured by other indices or indicators. The relationship between some of these indices and the Organised Crime Index are examined here. Seven indices were chosen⁹ on the basis of relevance, comprehensiveness and diversity.¹⁰

Three indices measure (components of) organised crime:

- The organised crime indicator produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)¹¹ measures the extent to which organised crime might harm government and businesses.
- The organised crime indicator by the World Economic Forum (WEF)¹² measures the cost of organised crime to businesses.
- The Global Slavery Index (GSI)¹³ measures the scale of modern slavery using an estimate of the number of victims.

The other four indices measure aspects of development, governance, peace and state fragility:

- The Human Development Index (HDI) measures the level of socio-economic development.
- The Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) measures governance performance.
- The Global Peace Index (GPI) measures the level of 'peacefulness'.
- The Fragile States Index (FSI) measures social, economic and political pressures that affect, and potentially strain, states.

Looking at pairwise correlations between the seven indices first suggests that none of the indices are very highly correlated with each other, suggesting that each additional index adds value to the analysis. The Fragile States Index is most highly correlated with the other indices included here, especially with the Ibrahim Index

⁹ Most recent data available was used.

¹⁰ The Illicit Trade Environment Index could not be included in the analysis owing to low coverage of relevant countries (less than 50% of the Organised Crime Index countries were covered by the Illicit Trade Index).

¹¹ "This index poses the question, Is organised crime likely to be a problem for government and/or business?" It is based on country expertise.

¹² The indicator is included in the security pillar of the Global Competitiveness Index, and based on an opinion survey of business executives: 'In your country, to what extent does organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) impose costs on businesses?'

¹³ The index is based on household surveys measuring the number of victims of modern slavery.

of African Governance (-0.76), and with the Global Peace Index (-0.71).¹⁴ The Human Development Index, in contrast, has among the weakest relationships to the other indices included here, especially to the Global Peace Index (0.18) and the EIU organised-crime indicator (-0.14).

4.4.1 Organised crime indicators

Turning to the relationship between indicators of organised crime and the criminality component of the Organised Crime Index, the results indicate an expected positive relationship. The strength of the relationship between the EIU organised-crime indicator and that of the WEF, and the criminality component of the Organised Crime Index is almost the same (0.62 and 0.6, respectively). This may suggest that while there is a clear link between the three indices, the criminality component of the Organised Crime Index captures much more than just the relationship between organised crime and business, the primary focus of the other two indices. The relationship between the two external organised-crime indicators, on the other hand, is much lower (0.37) despite their similarities. This may partially be due to different perceptions of the extent of organised crime between experts and business executives, those who provided the input for these indicators.¹⁵

Analysing the relationship between criminal markets and criminal actors, and the two organised-crime indicators suggests that the criminal-actors subcomponent has a slightly stronger relationship with the WEF and EIU indicators (0.59 and 0.64, respectively). These indices measure the extent to which organised crime affects business, and the results may indicate that businesses are more negatively affected by the strength of criminal actors than by the scale of criminal markets. This result would seem to point to the fact that what drives organised-crime actors is profit, which erodes legitimate businesses.

Lastly, the relationship between prevalence of modern slavery – measured by the Global Slavery Index – and the human-trafficking indicator included in the criminal-markets component of the Organised Crime Index is moderately positive (0.49). Although both indicators measure the same exploitative markets, the criminal-markets assessment of the Organised Crime Index goes far beyond the mere count of victims, but considers issues around the impact that such crimes have on society and the state, their links with other illicit economies, as well as victim profiles – which may explain the only moderate correlation between the two measures.

14. To allow for easier analysis, the scale for the Global Peace Index was inverted.


15. The scale of the WEF organised-crime indicator was inverted for ease of analysis.



4.4.2 Development, governance, peace and state fragility indicators

Analysing the relationship between the indices measuring development, governance and peace with resilience and criminality, the directionality of the relationships is as expected: the relationship is positive for resilience and negative for criminality. By contrast, state fragility was found to be negatively related to resilience, and positively related to criminality.

FIGURE 4.18
Correlations with other indices



The analysis suggests that the criminality component of the Organised Crime Index is most highly correlated with the Global Peace Index (-0.67) and the Fragile States Index (0.57), driven by their correlation with criminal actors rather than by their relationship with criminal markets. Given the important role organised crime often plays in conflict zones, and the significant role conflict actors play in the illicit economy, these results are hardly surprising.

What is more surprising are the results for criminality and the Human Development Index. The analysis suggests a much lower correlation between these two indices (-0.25), indicating that stability and peace play a much more important role in determining the extent of organised crime than the level of socio-economic development. This is not to say that development is not inextricably linked to organised crime: for example, by providing greater opportunity and resources to its people, states lay the foundation to minimise conditions that are conducive to organised crime. However, the relationship between organised crime and development may also be more ambiguous. Development can drive organised crime, by creating opportunities for it to flourish, for example through improved infrastructure and trade.





Section 5

CONTINENTAL VULNERABILITIES

5 Continental Vulnerabilities

The Organised Crime Index does not measure state vulnerability, focusing instead on the impact of criminality and levels of resilience. Nevertheless, a discussion of vulnerability is crucial to frame the way in which the results of the Index may be interpreted.

FIGURE 5.1
Vulnerability to organised crime



There are numerous factors that can contribute to a country's vulnerability to organised crime. It has been well documented that organised-crime groups exploit certain state conditions in order to carry out their activities. Features such as conflict, lack of trust in state institutions, porous borders, and social and economic inequalities may all contribute to an environment in which organised crime can flourish.¹ Moreover, economic growth and development may also engender vulnerabilities to organised crime. Discussions surrounding vulnerability to organised crime must reflect the reality that not all states are equal in their susceptibility to illicit activities, and that a number of sources of

¹ Global Initiative, *Organized crime and its role in contemporary conflict*, Policy note, September 2018; Judith Vorrath, *Containing illicit flows at African borders*, SWP International, July 2017; Keith Blackburn, Kyriakos C. Neanidis, Maria Paola Rana, *A theory of organized crime, corruption and economic growth*, *Economic Theory bulletin* Volume 5, Issue 2, October 2017.

vulnerability cannot be mitigated. The Organised Crime Index rests on the basic premise that the analysis of states' relationship to organised crime starts from an unequal foundation. By considering vulnerability patterns across the continent, Index users can more readily understand the complexity involved in an organised-crime analysis within a state context.

Moreover, what may be relevant to one state's susceptibility to organised crime may prove immaterial to another. Consequently, state vulnerability to organised crime arises from a multidimensional combination of various conditions, representing either a lack of or abundance of certain factors, as well as a state's inability to convert certain conditions into an achieved state of resilience to organised crime.

From a policy perspective, it is important to highlight vulnerability to organised crime as a dynamic phenomenon that may change over time. As such, Index users should consider the relationship between how systemic conditions evolve and the prevalence of organised crime (through consideration of the overall assessment of the Organised Crime Index), in order to tailor responses that have a greater and more sustainable impact.

The unemployed or marginalised may be vulnerable to recruitment by organised-crime syndicates, as a means of seeking social inclusion, protection and economic livelihood.

5.1 Economic vulnerability

Looking at a state's economy (including its structural economic inequalities) provides insights into how vulnerable its legitimate economy may be to organised crime. For example, investment risk, which may include factors such as the degree of ease of doing business in a country, is predicated upon a country's regulatory environment.² Indeed, regulations can help ease asymmetries by levelling the playing field for citizens to pursue economic activities. By increasing opportunities for legitimate, regulated business, states can strengthen resistance to incursions by criminal groups.³ Likewise, issues such as income and wealth inequality, and lack of employment opportunity may exclude individuals from opportunities within the formal economy, allowing criminal groups to exploit their vulnerabilities.⁴ High unemployment rates may threaten to increase the number of individuals alienated from mainstream society and challenge efforts to integrate marginal groups. The unemployed or marginalised may be vulnerable to recruitment by organised-crime syndicates, as a means of seeking social inclusion, protection and economic livelihood.

² World Bank Group, *Doing Business 2017: Equal Opportunity for All Report*, 2017, <http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB17-Report.pdf>.

³ Rachel Locke, *Organised crime, conflict and fragility: A new approach*, International Peace Institute, July 2012, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/epub_organized_crime_conflict_fragility.pdf.

⁴ *Vulnerabilities to Trafficking*, Labourexploitation.org, http://www.labourexploitation.org/sites/default/files/publications/Vulnerabilities%20to%20trafficking_final.pdf.

Moreover, economic crises mean that legitimate businesses may become subjected to infiltration by criminal groups, as they may become more vulnerable to concessions.⁵ This may be particularly true for states with economies that lack diversity and are over-reliant on one sector.

Where communities feel distrust in the state or a lack of belonging, they may become vulnerable to organised-criminal groups seeking to establish informal control over political and social life.

The state of a country's economy, including estimations of the size of a country's informal economy, can also be telling, in that this can drive up organised crime.⁶ Often, organised crime is so widespread and embedded in local culture that ordinary citizens may regularly engage in organised crime without viewing it as a crime or as posing a moral problem.⁷

5.2 Physical, geographic and natural-resource vulnerability

A country's physical location, geography and natural resources may also increase its risk of exploitation by organised-criminal groups. For example, countries with very long borders or coastlines may not have the capacity to monitor them effectively. Large archipelagos also pose a well-recognised vulnerability, as they offer the opportunity for entry of illicit goods and concealment of smuggling activities.

The presence of certain natural resources may also place a country at risk of organised crime (as may the presence of such resources in neighbouring states, given the transnational nature of organised crime). Organised pillaging of environmental resources for profit can lead to increased levels of violence and fuel instability. Oil production, for example, may make a country vulnerable to groups engaging in oil bunkering,⁸ while a country with high concentrations of endangered species is more vulnerable to poaching activity than one with lower levels of biodiversity.

Large areas of forest may increase a state's vulnerability to illicit logging, which contributes to deforestation, deprives communities of their livelihoods, causes ecological problems, like flooding, and is a major contributor to climate change.⁹

⁵ Global Agenda Council on Organized Crime, World Economic Forum, 2011, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GAC_OrganizedCrime_Report_2010-11.pdf.

⁶ Transnational Organised Crime in the West Africa Region, UNODC, 2005, https://www.unodc.org/pdf/transnational_crime_west-africa-05.pdf.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Razing Africa: Combatting criminal consortia in the logging sector, ENACT, September 2018, <https://enactafrica.org/research/research-papers/razing-africa-combatting-criminal-consortia-in-the-logging-sector>.

5.3 Social cohesion and conflict

Social cohesion is an indication of a positive relationship between the state and its governed populations, and between citizens themselves. Where social cohesion is absent, however, it can lead to a community becoming vulnerable to organised crime. For example, systemic marginalisation of minority groups and immigrants can be indicative of communities' susceptibility to organised crime.

Similarly, where communities feel distrust in the state or a lack of belonging, they may become vulnerable to organised-criminal groups seeking to establish informal control over political and social life. This situation may be exacerbated in societies with high levels of violent crime or with large prison populations.¹⁰

Conflict may undermine the level of cohesiveness in a society, particularly the governing role of the state and its capacity to offer basic services. In instances of conflict, where states are weak or fragile, criminal groups may seek opportunities to exploit underdevelopment, weak rule of law and instability. Conflict also acts as a regional destabiliser, in that its presence in neighbouring states may contribute to another country's susceptibility to organised crime. Moreover, opportunistic criminals may exploit societal divisions in conflict-ridden areas by forming alliances with actors hostile to the state in order to expand their resource and patronage base. In conflict-driven states, access to weapons may also be attributed to limited state capacity and reach, increasing the population's vulnerability to organised crime.¹¹

Other factors, such as unconstitutional regime change, may also subject a state to the risk of organised crime. Such events divert attention and resources, resulting in a governance vacuum. This allows for the movement of illicit commodities and people to remain unchecked. Where strong state institutions are absent, powerful criminal networks may emerge as intermediaries between the state and citizens' access to services.¹² Criminal groups may then step into the role of government, providing services where legitimate state structures have failed to do so, as seen in the case of al-Shabaab in East Africa, which has been designated as both a terrorist and organised-criminal group.¹³

5.4 Socio-demographic and trade vulnerability

Socio-demographic conditions may also influence the levels and structure of organised-criminal activities. Countries with large youth populations, for example, may experience increased vulnerability to infiltration by organised crime, as young people are often in search of an elusive sense of belonging and purpose, and thus may be more susceptible to recruitment by criminal groups.

Rapid urbanisation can result in a situation in which a state may struggle to provide adequate protection and social services, which may, in turn, create a power vacuum that is captured by those profiting from illegal economies.¹⁴

Although globalisation facilitates international trade and the advancement of technology, it also increases the difficulty in monitoring and regulating international flows, leaving room for

¹⁰ Steven Dudley and James Bargent, *The prison dilemma: Latin America's incubators of organized crime*, January 2017, <http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/prison-dilemma-latin-america-incubators-organized-crime..>

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Kwesi Aning, Sampson B Kwarkye and John Pokoo, *Getting smart and scaling up: The impact of organized crime on governance in developing countries - a case study of Ghana*, New York University, June 2013, http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/kavanagh_crime_developing_countries_ghana_study.pdf.

¹³ Tuesday Reitano, Colin Clarke and Laura Adal, *Examining the nexus between organised crime and terrorism and its implications for EU programming*, International Centre for Counter-terrorism, April 2017, <https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/OC-Terror-Nexus-Final.pdf>.

¹⁴ Erin Torkelson, *The challenge of organised crime and urbanisation*, ISS, February 2011, <https://oldsite.issafrica.org/iss-today/the-challenge-of-organised-crime-and-urbanisation>.

exploitation by organised-criminal groups. And while social engagement, such as widespread access to the internet and mobile technology, can improve quality of life, connect people and enable business, such technology simultaneously facilitates criminal activities.

The higher the level of a state's international economic engagement, marked by its infrastructure, in the form of ports and airports, the greater the ease with which goods and people can move between it and other countries. Improved cross-border trade offers opportunities for integrating illicit trade with legal commerce.¹⁵ Meanwhile, tools of global diplomacy, while important, may provide incentives in which commodities are redirected and transferred through the black market.

5.5 Organised crime and the economy, population and land area

While many socio-economic circumstances are universally accepted as increasing a country's susceptibility to high levels of organised crime, such as inequality and high unemployment, for example, there are many other factors whose effects on vulnerability are ambiguous. Here, it is important to examine the role played by key economic, demographic and geographic indicators.

Four indicators were chosen for analysis: gross domestic product (GDP), gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita), population and land area. Addressing certain vulnerabilities can in many ways kill two birds with one stone. Reducing unemployment rates, for example, can help achieve core development goals while simultaneously reducing vulnerability to organised crime. However, it cannot be universally assumed that improving development indicators results in a reduction in organised crime (for reasons explained earlier). In fact, in some core development sectors, economic growth may prove a double-edged sword.

One argument is that a richer nation will quite simply have more resources, such as oil, gold and other minerals, for criminal actors to exploit. Furthermore, trade infrastructure is systematically exploited by organised-crime actors to operationalise their activities. So, the wealthier a nation, and by extension the greater the sophistication of trade infrastructure, the greater the scope for exploitation by organised crime.

Among the 15 highest-scoring countries for criminality, seven feature in the top-15 largest economies.

The counterargument, however, is that wealthier countries are more able to not only counter the threat of organised crime effectively, but also reduce the incentives for organised crime in the first place, should they choose to implement the required measures. Larger budgets for law-enforcement agencies, a well-resourced criminal-justice system and sophisticated border-control technology are all necessary to tackle organised crime. At the same time,


¹⁵ *The globalization of crime: A transnational organized crime threat assessment*, UNODC, 2010, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf.

in a country experiencing low unemployment, citizens are less likely to turn to the informal economy to make a living.

In an effort to explore further the relationship between the size of an economy and both its levels of, and resilience to, organised crime, the correlations between the indicators were tested. The results show that there is a statistically significant and positive relationship between GDP and the

criminality score. The correlation coefficient of 0.37 indicates that, while the relationship is relatively weak, wealthier countries are indeed more likely to experience higher levels of organised crime. The lowest-scoring country in the Index for criminality, Nigeria, is also the country with the largest GDP. Nigeria is, therefore, a good example of a country whose vast resources, both natural and economic, increase the incentive for organised-criminal activity.

FIGURE 5.2
Criminality and the size of the economy



Among the 15 highest-scoring countries for criminality, seven feature in the top-15 largest economies. However, as the relatively weak correlation suggests, there are a considerable number of cases in which the opposite argument appears to hold. The Central African Republic, for example, while ranking third overall on criminality, is

a relatively poor economy, ranking 45th in terms of GDP. Somalia is another example of a country with a limited economy scoring very high for criminality. And, at the other end of the criminality spectrum, with relatively low levels of organised crime, lies Algeria, the fourth-largest economy in Africa.

A similar analysis was carried out on the relationship between GDP per capita and criminality. Using GDP as a measure of development has long been recognised as problematic, the argument being that the wealth of citizens is a more apt proxy, as it captures a country's standard of living rather than just the absolute wealth of the nation. The results show that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between GDP per capita and criminality, though as with GDP, this relationship is weak. The correlation of -0.31 does suggest, however, that higher levels of prosperity for citizens are associated with lower levels of organised crime. The correlation between criminality and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance is -0.44 , which would also suggest that countries with a higher quality of governance are associated with lower levels of organised crime.


The relationships between population size, total land area and criminality were also assessed. While larger populations may be more difficult to control, thus making it more challenging to stamp out organised crime, the diffusion and entrenchment of criminality may be facilitated in a smaller population. Similar dynamics may be borne out with regard to the size of the country. Governments may seriously struggle to stem the rise of organised crime in large countries, particularly in those in which vast swathes of land are not under the control of the central state. A large number of entry points and lengthy borders also provide opportunities for organised criminal actors to exploit.

The results show a positive and statistically significant relationship between criminality and both population (0.52) and land area (0.49). Both of these relationships are in fact stronger than the relationship found between GDP and criminality, which perhaps reflects that ambiguity of the relationship between the size of an economy and levels of organised crime, as discussed above.

While the relationship between these two demographic and geographic indicators and organised crime is relatively strong, their association with resilience is, by contrast, statistically insignificant. In other words, there is no clear relationship between the size of a country or its population, and a country's resilience to organised crime. Conversely, results show that there is a positive relationship between GDP and resilience. The correlation, standing at 0.33 , indicates that wealthier countries are more likely to have higher levels of resilience to organised crime. This may be a result of a greater scope for investment in law-enforcement agencies, the criminal-justice system, public-awareness campaigns and enhanced social-protection measures. However, there are numerous and important outliers to this correlation, where countries with small economies nevertheless have high levels of resilience to organised crime. Cabo Verde, for example, the country most resilient to organised crime, has a very small GDP. Other island states with smaller economies, such as Seychelles and Mauritius, are similarly resilient to organised crime. At the same time, countries such as Libya and the Democratic Republic of Congo, both countries with large economies, perform extremely poorly on resilience. These cases underscore that while money helps, it is by no means a prerequisite to building resilience to organised crime, and that good governance can also have significant, if not greater, impact on mitigating the preconditions and vulnerabilities to organised crime.







Section 6

RESPONSE IMPLICATIONS

6 Response implications

There are many things that can be drawn from the Organised Crime Index that hopefully will contribute to better policymaking and responses at national, regional and international levels. The design and results are intended to inform policymakers on where attention should be prioritised, and which countries should be prioritised. The ultimate goal of the Index is to provide stakeholders with a greater evidence base in order to effectuate tailor-made response measures to reduce organised crime successfully.

The findings of the Index are rich, and offer many insights across a range of markets and resilience indicators. Even if individual countries may dispute the conclusions or scores that have been awarded, at the very least it is with the hope that the process of interrogating those scores will prompt a self-reflection, and start a dialogue on the nature of criminal threats, understanding criminal actors and their inter-relationships, and considering what makes a country resilient to organised crime's threats and harms.

It is clear that there is no single resilience measure that offers a 'one size fits all' response to organised crime. What works in one country may prove to be ineffective in another, and therefore responses must take into account the particular organised-crime situation in a given country. Even in the same country, response measures that may have worked in the past may not fully address evolving criminal trends.

Considered debate will certainly be required, as there are no policy remedies that can be easily prescribed. Reducing the space for organised crime to develop and its negative impact is a long-term and complex endeavour that will take sustained investment and political will over numerous years, as well as collaboration with other states well beyond any country's immediate neighbours. With future iterations, the

Index should offer policymakers more comprehensive insights into evolving trends, as they will build on data and information over time.

Of all the implications that are considered in this report, the analysis of the resilience–criminality confluence is perhaps the most insightful and relevant. Layering the quadrant graph shown in Figure 2.1 (page 32) onto a map

What the data from the Index highlights, however, is that Africa as a continent is the source, confluence or thoroughfare for numerous types of illicit flows and markets.

highlights clearly the patterns of vulnerability, but also shows which states are demonstrating considerable resilience, even from a low baseline. Because the Index rests on the premise that states may start on an unequal footing in terms of inherent vulnerabilities, while their current placement is important, more important will be focusing on the direction in which states move, and considering what efforts can be made to move states into more positive scenarios.


It is also worth noting that while well over a third of the continent appears to be in a position of serious vulnerability, with high levels of criminality and low resilience, they have immediate neighbours that are in the most positive positions, with low crime and high resilience. These geographic differentials are indicators of inherent resilience or the triumph of concerted efforts to prevent the cross-border spillover of criminality.

Responding to specific criminal markets is typically the primary framework in which the fight against organised crime is undertaken. What the data from the Index highlights, however, is that Africa as a continent is the source, confluence or thoroughfare for numerous types of illicit flows and markets. Taking a market-specific approach can result in overlooking less prevalent markets, or belie finding synergies and addressing the root causes and drivers of poly-criminality, including the actors involved.

The analysis provided in the Index, as well as its findings, suggest that there are benefits in considering each quadrant as having distinct characteristics, and therefore crafting differentiated response frameworks that would respond to the challenges faced by the states of each quadrant accordingly, taking into account national and subregional specificities as a matter of course.

FIGURE 6.1

Mapping criminality and resilience



6.1 Low crime – high resilience

Though only 11 countries (20% of the continent) currently fall in this quadrant, they are arguably the continental success stories. Examining the individual histories of these countries demonstrates that they have built up their resilience frameworks on the foundation of good governance principles, with the commitment of considerable political will, to respond to a specific threat. They are counterweights to the arguments that we are losing the fight against organised crime, or that it cannot be won.

Cabo Verde, for example, falls in this quadrant, and it is the highest-ranking country in the resilience index, scoring above 6 in all but one of the building blocks of resilience. Yet the country has long been known as a drug-trafficking entrepôt¹ and has been battling the resultant money laundering, corruption, violence and the threat of expansion of criminal markets that this pernicious threat engenders. The government has a coherent strategy to combat organised crime, in particular the consumption and trafficking of narcotics, which is a high priority in Cabo Verde. Strong international cooperation, freedom of press and low levels corruption are some of the areas in which Cabo Verde scores highly, suggesting that it has developed the foundational governance functions that make a country resilient, so that organised crime does not harm its overall development and the security of its citizens.

Botswana similarly stands out – ranked 51st in the Index, with one of the lowest criminality scores on the continent. This comes despite experiencing the same kinds of threats as neighbouring countries in Southern Africa – virulent ivory poaching networks, predatory illicit trading and violent groups targeting the extractives sector. Botswana nonetheless received low scores for non-renewable-resource crimes due in large part to the state's highly formalised and well-regulated diamond sector, and it retains one of the largest elephant populations in Africa. There is little evidence of corruption or the existence of mafia-style groups in Botswana, and

the country achieves high scores for international cooperation, political leadership and governance, and national policies and laws, demonstrating what can be achieved with strong political will.

There is considerably more that could be done to understand, document and disseminate the lessons of the success stories from the countries in this quadrant. There is rarely good news or positive examples cited in the organised-crime domain, and this is a wasted opportunity. Furthermore, there is scope for these countries to play an exemplary and leadership role in regional and continental responses, either through bilateral or multilateral engagement.

6.2 Low crime – low resilience

The states in this category are in some ways the easiest to address. If states currently experience low levels of crime, then building resilience is a preventive strategy, which should be targeted either at those states lying closest to the mid-point cusp of the Index, or which (in subsequent years) see rising levels of crime, captured by future iterations of the Index.

Another priority would be to support those countries in this category that share borders with countries that are classified as high crime and low resilience, as they are essentially functioning as buffers to the high-crime regions. Good examples include Zambia and Malawi in Southern Africa, or Benin and Burkina Faso in West Africa.

Preventive activities should, however, not be restricted to just ameliorating border control and law-enforcement capacity or enacting laws, as those have been demonstrated as having limited utility in isolation. Instead, they should aim for a holistic strengthening across the 12 resilience indicators, including in particular, those foundational sectors such as governance and transparency, the economic regulatory environment and the role of non-state actors, all of which reduce the enabling environment for crime and prevent the more toxic combination of state actors that manifest in those countries with the highest levels of crime.

¹ Mouhamadou Kane, *Can Cape Verde keep drug traffickers out?*, ENACT Africa, Institute for Security Studies, 4 June 2019.


Gabon, for example, has lower levels of criminality than most countries in Africa. It received notable scores only for high levels of illegality in the timber industry, the trade in elephant ivory, and moderate evidence of forced labour, sexual exploitation and irregular migration facilitated by smugglers. Yet, even with comparatively low levels of resilience – Gabon ranks 41st in Africa on the resilience index – the country has considerably lower levels of criminality than some of its immediate neighbours. Law enforcement and territorial integrity are moderately effective in the country, despite the porosity of its borders and the subregional criminal ecosystems. Perhaps with investments in addressing some of the foundational weaknesses that the Index has identified, including high levels of corruption, lack of government legitimacy in the eyes of the population, and weak economic and financial institutional and regulatory frameworks, Gabon could become a counter-crime bastion for the region in years to come.

6.3 High crime – high resilience

Only three African countries sit in what is arguably the most interesting quadrant in the Index: those that demonstrate both high levels of crime and high levels of resilience. Kenya, South Africa and Nigeria are the socio-economic powerhouses of their respective continental regions. All three demonstrate large and diverse criminality profiles, high levels of corruption, crime-related violence and the presence of all four criminal actor categories.

FIGURE 6.2

Criminality and resilience - Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa



This suggests that organised crime has introduced a level of fragility that belies apparent strength of these three countries economically and politically, and which undermines the democratic traditions and institutions that these countries have been building. The challenges that South Africa is facing in 2019, as this report is being written, are symptomatic of that vulnerability. Levels of organised crime have increased over the past decade. The Zuma regime exemplified the nexus between senior state officials and foreign criminal networks, which the Index has highlighted as being particularly damaging. This combines with extremely high levels of violence at the street level to prompt civil protest, unrest and discord across the country, which is threatening to set back and fracture South African society.

The three countries that fall in this quadrant have become the gateways and hubs of criminality in Africa, and their failure would have very serious ramifications for the wider region and the continent as a whole. Therefore, careful consideration as to how to reinforce these countries should be an urgent priority. Their high resilience scores suggest a foundation to build upon, which is a positive indicator, and customised strategies will have to be designed to address the shortcomings.

There are further lessons to be learned from the countries in this quadrant, and it would be judicious to think and intervene preventively to shore up countries whose profiles display similar characteristics – large economies, good infrastructure for trade and communications, but with rising levels of corruption and socio-political unrest. Ghana, Senegal and Morocco may fall into this category, judging by their current placement in the Index, and their future trajectory should be monitored.

6.4 High crime – low resilience

The 20 countries in this quadrant, which represent a large portion of the continent, suggest a significant vulnerability to organised crime. They demonstrate high levels of crime and insufficient capacity to respond. But the composition of this group is far from homogeneous. It includes the continent's long-standing conflict and fragile states, whose placement in this quadrant is perhaps unsurprising, as well as states that have far more robust institutions, but for which state integrity or democratic orientation may compromise their ability to be effective.

As discussed in section 5.3, there is a growing body of analysis that has been invested in understanding how illicit economies snowball into situations of conflict and insecurity, in particular where there is a presence of natural resources of various kinds, and the findings of the Index reflect this phenomenon. There are, however, few credible practical examples of how these war economies can be prevented or reversed as conflicts come to their resolution. In fact, increasingly the illicit economy and actors operating within it are being identified as spoilers in a peacebuilding or transitional setting, and strongmen who exploited the illicit economy in wartime have too often transformed into strategically placed state-embedded criminal actors in newly consolidating democracies. It is notable that none of the countries in the high-resilience – low crime category has experienced a conflict in the last three decades, which highlights the protracted implications of war. Understanding and preventing these dynamics is important, though challenging, and will require responses that are predicated on a close understanding of the national and local political economies.

A small number of other countries found in this quadrant, though situated much closer to the borderlines, are a select number of stronger states. A few countries, including Egypt and Côte d'Ivoire, sit just below the midpoint quadrant cut-off line, and arguably should be in a higher resilience category. However, they are held back by a combination of lack of political will and prioritisation, evidence of widespread corruption and impunity, and an overly securitised approach, which has exacerbated social disruption. Addressing the governance or resilience deficits in these countries is a meaningful goal, and one that could be achievable with the right commitment from the governments of those countries.

Tanzania, which also sits in the high crime – low resilience category was scored thus by experts because they noted a distinct backsliding by the government in terms of addressing crime. While the building blocks of resilience were seen as being in place, retrogressive policies to counter drug trafficking and use in particular, and a failure to take the steps necessary to prevent wildlife poaching, were seen to have held back the otherwise solid foundation of these country's resilience building blocks. In addition, a decline in press freedom, government officials' alleged involvement in criminal networks, and a business environment likely to provide incentives for citizens to engage in illicit activities are among the reasons for the low scores that experts attributed.

In both of the scenarios described for the countries in this quadrant, and what is common to them both, is that the traditional and reflexive responses to criminality – focused on law enforcement and border control – can have only very limited traction in contexts where the rule of law itself is compromised and political will is absent due to lack of capacity or design. In these contexts, investing in establishing other forms of resilience through non-state actors, including civil society and the private sector, can counterbalance and potentially promote better state engagement.

6.5 Criminal actors

The importance of the criminal actor analysis, and disaggregating between the different typology of criminal actors, has pertinent implications for

responses to organised crime. Though they are important, an overemphasis or an exclusive focus on criminal markets will obscure this paradigm.

There is often the tendency to prioritise responses that seek to reduce violence, namely by targeting overtly violent actors. As the Index has highlighted, in fact those mafia-style groups that govern localised areas by deploying violence have proved to have a less significant impact on African states than other forms of criminal actors.

Instead, it is in those states that display high levels of state-embedded criminality that more urgent consideration is needed. In a similar way to the discussion of countries where the rule of law is compromised, in contexts where state-embedded criminality is prevalent, then the traditional policy and response frameworks are likely to fall short. State-embedded criminality will actively work to hinder effective implementation of agencies charged with ending organised crime. They will co-opt law enforcement, subvert the judiciary, divert the resources of their state meant for service delivery to communities and for victims, and in some cases they will instrumentalise violent actors to protect their own interests. In doing so, they not only erode resilience, but further discredit the legitimacy of the state, with long-term implications that will be hard to reverse.

The Index, in its analysis and findings, offers a means by which to understand and monitor the nature of criminal activity and the impact of criminal actors on the continent, which will hopefully be pertinent for those looking to define better sets of responses and engage appropriate partners in the fight against organised crime.

6.6 Concluding implications

Drawing together a few short take-aways from the Index, there are four implications of this analysis that are most pertinent:

1. There is value in investing in efforts to build data and an evidence basis, and gaining a structured understanding of the nature of organised crime and the components of resilience, in particular


how they function together. The Organised Crime Index offers a model to do this. With subsequent iterations, it will develop to produce a rich analytical tool on which priorities can be set and the efficacy of responses can be piloted and evaluated. The knowledge starting point for Africa is quite a low bar – the quality of data and expertise is weak and fragmented, and a common nomenclature is absent, which makes it far harder to achieve consensus and cooperation. The Organised Crime Index can provide a framework on which to build on these gaps.

2. While the challenges of organised crime are profound and long-lasting, evidence both from positive and negative cases has shown that political will and committed leadership can have tangible results. The successes and nascent resilience of countries are insufficiently highlighted, analysed and disseminated.

3. Conversely, effective responses to organised crime require a foundation of good governance and the rule of law if they are to gain traction. Corruption, impunity, lack of transparency, weak governance and development orientation will undermine and distort traditional criminal-justice response efforts. Thus, where evidence exists of state-actor complicity in criminal markets, the response framework should be different. Where there is little evidence of criminality and corruption, overall improvements to the quality of governance and institutions can have a positive, preventive effect.

4. Resilience to organised crime is a broad-based concept, and sources of resilience can come both from the state and from a diverse range of non-state actors. Where the state is unwilling or unable to prioritise the fight against organised crime, investments to build the capacity and protect the environment for non-state actors can mitigate the harm of criminality. An overemphasis on criminal markets, and a lack of analysis on the nature of criminal actors enabling those markets might prevent these kinds of distinctions being made.





Section 7

CONCLUSION

7 Conclusion

The development of a combination of illicit markets in Africa, shaped by violence and corruption, has impacted people on the continent in ways that are multidimensional, longitudinal and complex. Criminal organisations use legitimate state structures to carry and circulate illicit goods and reduce the risks of successful prosecution. Organised crime also poses obstacles to reducing poverty, distorts local economies, hinders trade and redirects resources that could be dedicated to improving basic services. In addition, links have been made between forms of organised crime, conflict and violent extremism in Africa.

As organised crime continues to grow, responses will require a holistic understanding of the phenomenon and its impact on the different areas of society, both within the African continent and abroad. The Organised Crime Index endeavours to shed light on the impact of organised crime by monitoring, analysing, reporting and measuring illicit markets, and build networks throughout the continent to combat organised crime in a unified way.

Through its criminality and resilience components, the Index focuses attention on the growing threat presented by transnational crime on the continent, in order to provide guidance to policymakers and continental regional bodies, helping them prioritise their interventions based on a multifaceted assessment of where vulnerabilities lie, and providing them with the means to measure the efficacy of their interventions.

The Index is a multi-layered tool that allows users to analyse information through geographic, substantive, and eventually temporal, perspectives. Policymakers and practitioners are provided with a means to compare countries and regions, encouraging multilateral cooperation and responses. Users are also able to juxtapose information on criminal markets with other areas of society (such as governance, economics, criminal justice etc.), and move forward in developing their responses to organised crime based on empirical data.

Criminal organisations use legitimate state structures to circulate illicit goods and reduce the risks of successful prosecution. Organised crime also poses obstacles to reducing poverty, distorts local economies, hinders trade and redirects resources that could be dedicated to improving basic services.

Through future publications, the Index will offer insight into continental trends over time, providing a valuable supplement to policymakers' knowledge base in order to develop targeted and effective responses to organised crime.








Section 8

THE ORGANISED CRIME INDEX WEBSITE

The Organised Crime Index website


A dedicated website – ocindex.net – has been created to present the results of the Enact Organised Crime Index.

The website has a home page which introduces the Index, featuring the criminality heatmap as the landing page. The 'Heatmap Scores' webpage allows users to visualise the scores map for any of the 10 criminal markets, four criminal actor types and 12 resilience indicators included in the index, in addition to the aggregate component and subcomponent scores. Furthermore, the website allows for a side-by-side comparison of any of the Index's scores, both aggregated and disaggregated.





8.1 Sort and compare

While organised crime and responses differ from country to country, organised crime is nevertheless a global problem. Under both the criminality and resilience components of the Index, countries are ranked based on their scores in order to offer users the option for comparative analysis across the African continent. Above all, country rankings are meant to start a conversation among policymakers and regional bodies, encouraging them to delve deeper into how and why organised crime affects their respective countries, and learn from one another in order to develop effective resilience strategies.



8.2 Country profiles

In addition to the scores and rankings, the Organised Crime Index website allows users to explore country profiles that explain the context behind each country's scores. Country profiles outline scores for each component (i.e. criminality and resilience), subcomponent (i.e. criminal markets and criminal actors) and indicators. The country profiles also provide background information on each specific country context, and highlight key trends based on expert assessments.





8.3 Make your own comparisons

The Organised Crime Index offers a holistic framework of a country's overall relationship to organised crime. At the same time, its subcomponents and indicators allow users to disaggregate such information and determine correlations with various impact areas in any given country and/or region. Policymakers and other users are able to compare data geographically, substantively and, with future iterations of the Index, temporally, so that they can identify key trends.

Data Explorer

FILTER COUNTRIES

You can explore up to 4 variables simultaneously



Acknowledgements

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In the process of developing this pilot tool, the team drew on the support and expertise of over 200 people and would like to express their sincere gratitude to colleagues, experts, reviewers and research assistants for their tireless efforts to build a comprehensive and informative knowledge-sharing tool. Over a two-year period, experiences and informed opinions were exchanged, and lessons learned in order to develop the first organised crime index of its kind. It is with great hope that the tool allows for greater buy-in and collaboration in future iterations to build a larger evidence base from which stakeholders may draw in order to develop effective responses and ultimately successfully combat organised crime both in Africa and beyond.

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Appendix 1

Definition of criminal markets

Exploitative crime markets

Human trafficking

Drawing from a range of sources, the Index covers human trafficking within a modern slavery context and includes the trafficking of organs. In line with common interpretations of human trafficking, this criminal market does not require the movement of individuals, and includes men, women and children. When movement is involved, it may include both cross-border and internal flows (such as from rural to urban locations). For the purposes of the Index, human trafficking includes activity, means and purpose, and reflects all stages of the illicit activity, from recruitment and transfer, to harbouring and receipt of persons. To distinguish this market from that of human smuggling, trafficking in persons involves a form of coercion, deception, abduction or fraud, and is carried out for the purpose of exploitation, regardless of the victim's consent. In line with the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.

Human smuggling

Under the Index, human smuggling requires the criminalisation of the illegal entry, transit or residence of migrants (by land, sea or air) by an organised criminal group for the purposes of a financial or material benefit. Activity in this criminal economy reflects all stages of the illicit activity, including the producing, procuring, providing or possessing fraudulent travel or identity documents

when committed for the purpose of enabling the smuggling of migrants. Although distinct crimes, human smuggling may turn into trafficking when the element of exploitation is involved.

Trade market

Arms trafficking

The trafficking of arms involves the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of arms, their parts and components and ammunition across national borders, as well intentional diversion of firearms from legal to illegal commerce, without involving the movement of items across physical borders. 'Firearms' refers to any portable barrelled weapon that expels, is designed to expel or may be readily converted to expel a shot, bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, excluding antique firearms or their replicas, as per the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. 'Small arms' and 'light weapons' refer to range of specific weapons, as outlined by the Small Arms Survey. Often the trafficking of arms facilitates the commission of other organised crime activities.

Environmental markets

Flora crimes

Crimes related to flora involve the illicit trade as well possession of species covered by CITES (the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora), as well as other species protected under national law. Under the Index, to account for the plethora of species across the African continent, the 'top three' most illicitly traded

flora species in each country are considered, including high- and low-value timber, such as rosewood, roundwood and mahogany, as well as cycads.

Fauna crimes

Like flora crimes, crimes involving fauna species reflect the poaching, illicit trade in and possession of species covered by CITES, as well as any other species protected by national law. Under the Index, to account for the plethora of species across the African continent, the top five most illicitly traded and/or poached fauna species in each country are considered, including rhinos, elephants, great apes, lion bones and pangolins, among others. The Index also considers protected marine species, and illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing falls under this category.

Non-renewable resource crimes

The Index includes the illicit extraction, smuggling, mingling, bunkering or mining of natural resources. It also covers any illicit activities related to the trade of such products, including price misinvoicing. As with other environmental markets, to account for the wide range of natural resources throughout the African continent, the Index covers the top three commodities in each country, including for example oil, gold, gas, gemstones, diamonds and precious metals.

Drug markets

Heroin trade

The Index covers the production, distribution and sale of heroin. Consumption of the drug, while not in and of itself a form of organised crime, was considered in determining the 'reach' of the illicit drug market. Synthetic opioids are considered under the synthetic drugs category (see below).

Cocaine trade

Like heroin, the production, distribution and sale of cocaine and its derivatives are covered by the Index. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organised crime, was considered in determining the 'reach' of the illicit drug market.

Cannabis trade

The illicit cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis oil, resin, herb or leaves are covered by the Index. Consumption of the drug, while not in itself a form of organised crime, was considered in determining the 'reach' of the illicit drug market. Recognising the growing legalization of cannabis production, sale and consumption across countries, the Index focused solely on areas where an activity was criminalised and/or where criminal groups were involved in the supply chain.

Synthetic drugs trade

As with other illicit drug markets, the production, distribution and sale of synthetic drugs are covered by the Index. Notably, synthetic opioids, such as tramadol, as well as amphetamine-type stimulants, methamphetamines and fentanyl are included in this criminal market, as well as any other narcotic included in the 1972 Protocol, the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 and the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Consumption of such drugs, while not in itself a form of organised crime, was considered in determining the 'reach' of the illicit drug market. Notably, 'substandard and falsified medical products', as outlined by the World Health Organization, has been excluded.



Appendix 2

Rankings tables

Criminality scores

COUNTRY	SCORE
1. COLOMBIA*	8.20
2. NIGERIA	7.70
3. MEXICO*	7.38
4. DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO	7.29
5. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	6.86
6. SOUTH SUDAN	6.40
6. SOMALIA	6.40
8. SUDAN	6.38
9. LIBYA	6.26
10. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.23
11. MALI	6.20
12. SOUTH AFRICA	6.16
13. KENYA	6.14
14. UGANDA	6.05
15. PHILIPPINES*	6.04
16. CAMEROON	5.98
17. MOZAMBIQUE	5.86
18. CHAD	5.84
19. ALBANIA*	5.79
20. NIGER	5.74
21. TANZANIA	5.63
22. TOGO	5.56
23. EL SALVADOR*	5.41
23. ZIMBABWE	5.41
25. GUINEA	5.39
26. MADAGASCAR	5.38
27. EGYPT	5.14
28. SIERRA LEONE	5.00
29. GUINEA-BISSAU	4.99
30. BURKINA FASO	4.98
31. GHANA	4.89
32. MOROCCO	4.88
33. ZAMBIA	4.86

COUNTRY	SCORE
34. REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	4.85
35. LIBERIA	4.84
36. BENIN	4.83
37. ANGOLA	4.78
38. GABON	4.68
39. GAMBIA	4.61
40. SENEGAL	4.60
40. MAURITANIA	4.60
42. ETHIOPIA	4.58
43. BURUNDI	4.39
44. ERITREA	4.26
45. UNITED KINGDOM*	4.24
46. ALGERIA	4.21
47. MAURITIUS	4.16
48. JAPAN*	4.09
49. SEYCHELLES	3.93
50. MALAWI	3.88
51. NAMIBIA	3.81
52. CABO VERDE	3.74
52. COMOROS	3.74
54. DJIBOUTI	3.73
55. LESOTHO	3.65
56. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.53
57. ESWATINI	3.49
58. AUSTRALIA*	3.46
59. BOTSWANA	3.34
59. RWANDA	3.34
61. TUNISIA	3.26
62. CANADA*	2.99
62. SWEDEN*	2.99
64. SINGAPORE*	2.84
65. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.88

* Global benchmark countries used in the research

Criminal market scores

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	1. HUMAN TRAFFICKING	2. HUMAN SMUGGLING	3. ARMS TRAFFICKING	4. FLORA CRIMES	5. FAUNA CRIMES
1. MEXICO*	8.25	8.5	9.0	8.0	8.0	5.5
2. COLOMBIA*	7.90	7.5	7.0	9.5	8.0	6.5
3. NIGERIA	7.65	8.5	7.0	7.5	7.0	8.0
4. DEM. REP. OF CONGO	6.45	7.5	5.5	9.0	8.5	8.0
5. TANZANIA	6.25	6.0	6.0	5.5	7.0	7.0
6. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	5.95	7.0	5.0	7.0	7.5	6.5
6. CAMEROON	5.95	6.5	5.5	6.0	7.5	7.5
8. LIBYA	5.90	9.5	8.0	8.5	1.0	2.0
8. MALI	5.90	6.0	6.5	6.5	6.5	5.5
10. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	5.85	7.0	5.0	8.5	6.5	8.0
11. SUDAN	5.75	8.5	8.0	9.0	1.5	5.0
12. PHILIPPINES*	5.70	5.0	4.5	5.0	8.0	7.5
13. KENYA	5.65	6.0	6.0	7.0	4.0	6.5
14. LIBERIA	5.55	6.0	3.0	6.5	7.0	6.0
15. ALBANIA*	5.45	6.5	6.5	3.0	4.5	3.0
16. UGANDA	5.35	4.5	4.0	5.0	7.0	6.5
16. MOZAMBIQUE	5.35	5.0	4.5	4.0	8.5	7.5
16. NIGER	5.35	6.5	7.0	8.0	2.0	2.5
19. SOUTH AFRICA	5.20	3.5	4.0	7.0	2.0	7.5
20. GUINEA	5.15	6.5	3.5	6.0	4.5	5.5
20. GHANA	5.15	4.0	4.5	3.0	4.5	4.0
20. BENIN	5.15	5.0	3.5	3.0	7.0	5.5
23. GAMBIA	5.10	7.0	4.5	4.0	7.0	4.0
24. SOUTH SUDAN	5.05	7.0	4.0	8.0	8.0	6.5
24. CHAD	5.05	6.0	5.0	8.5	1.5	5.0
26. TOGO	5.00	6.0	3.0	5.5	5.0	7.0
26. MADAGASCAR	5.00	5.0	3.0	5.0	8.0	8.0
26. SIERRA LEONE	5.00	5.0	2.5	5.0	6.5	6.5
29. EL SALVADOR*	4.95	4.5	8.5	7.0	5.0	5.0
29. BURKINA FASO	4.95	5.0	5.0	6.0	3.5	5.0
31. GABON	4.85	6.0	6.0	4.5	8.0	7.0

* Global benchmark countries used in the research

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	6. NON- RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	7. HEROIN TRADE	8. COCAINE TRADE	9. CANNABIS TRADE	10. SYNTHETIC DRUGS TRADE
1. MEXICO*	8.25	8.0	8.0	9.5	8.0	10.0
2. COLOMBIA*	7.90	9.5	5.5	10.0	9.0	6.5
3. NIGERIA	7.65	9.0	6.5	6.5	8.0	8.5
4. DEM. REP. OF CONGO	6.45	9.0	4.0	3.5	7.0	2.5
5. TANZANIA	6.25	6.0	7.5	4.5	8.0	5.0
6. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	5.95	7.5	4.0	3.0	6.0	6.0
6. CAMEROON	5.95	7.5	4.0	2.0	6.0	7.0
8. LIBYA	5.90	8.5	2.5	3.5	8.0	7.5
8. MALI	5.90	7.5	3.5	6.0	5.0	6.0
10. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	5.85	9.0	3.0	1.5	3.0	7.0
11. SUDAN	5.75	8.5	2.0	2.5	8.5	4.0
12. PHILIPPINES*	5.70	7.5	3.5	3.0	4.0	9.0
13. KENYA	5.65	6.0	7.0	4.0	6.0	4.0
14. LIBERIA	5.55	7.0	5.5	5.0	6.5	3.0
15. ALBANIA*	5.45	6.0	7.0	8.5	7.5	2.0
16. UGANDA	5.35	7.0	5.0	3.0	7.0	4.5
16. MOZAMBIQUE	5.35	6.0	7.5	2.5	4.5	3.5
16. NIGER	5.35	6.5	4.0	5.0	6.0	6.0
19. SOUTH AFRICA	5.20	8.0	7.0	3.0	3.0	7.0
20. GUINEA	5.15	7.5	3.0	7.5	4.5	3.0
20. GHANA	5.15	7.5	6.0	5.5	7.0	5.5
20. BENIN	5.15	7.0	5.0	5.0	3.5	7.0
23. GAMBIA	5.10	5.0	5.0	6.0	6.0	2.5
24. SOUTH SUDAN	5.05	8.0	2.0	1.0	5.0	1.0
24. CHAD	5.05	4.0	3.5	4.0	6.0	7.0
26. TOGO	5.00	5.0	3.0	4.0	6.5	5.0
26. MADAGASCAR	5.00	7.5	4.5	2.5	5.0	1.5
26. SIERRA LEONE	5.00	7.0	2.0	4.0	7.0	4.5
29. EL SALVADOR*	4.95	1.5	1.5	7.5	7.0	2.0
29. BURKINA FASO	4.95	7.0	4.0	3.5	4.5	6.0
31. GABON	4.85	3.0	2.5	2.5	4.0	5.0

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	1. HUMAN TRAFFICKING	2. HUMAN SMUGGLING	3. ARMS TRAFFICKING	4. FLORA CRIMES	5. FAUNA CRIMES
32. SOMALIA	4.80	7.0	7.0	9.0	6.5	6.0
33. ZIMBABWE	4.70	5.0	3.0	3.5	4.0	7.5
34. EGYPT	4.65	5.5	5.5	6.0	1.0	5.0
35. ZAMBIA	4.60	5.0	2.5	4.0	8.0	6.0
36. ANGOLA	4.55	5.0	2.5	5.5	7.0	4.0
37. MOROCCO	4.50	4.0	6.0	1.5	2.5	4.5
38. REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	4.45	4.0	4.0	4.0	8.0	7.0
38. SENEGAL	4.45	5.0	4.5	3.5	7.0	6.5
40. ETHIOPIA	4.40	6.0	6.0	6.5	3.5	3.0
40. BURUNDI	4.40	7.5	5.5	7.5	1.5	4.0
42. GUINEA-BISSAU	4.35	3.0	2.5	4.5	8.0	5.5
43. ALGERIA	4.30	4.5	5.5	5.0	1.0	4.0
44. MALAWI	4.00	4.5	3.0	4.0	4.0	6.5
45. MAURITIUS	3.95	2.5	3.5	2.0	2.0	3.5
46. ERITREA	3.90	8.5	8.0	6.0	1.5	2.0
47. JAPAN*	3.80	4.0	5.0	4.0	6.0	4.0
47. RWANDA	3.80	5.0	3.0	4.5	3.0	5.0
49. MAURITANIA	3.70	7.0	4.5	3.5	1.0	3.0
50. SEYCHELLES	3.60	4.0	3.5	2.5	3.0	6.0
50. CABO VERDE	3.60	2.5	1.5	2.5	3.0	5.0
52. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.55	3.5	2.0	4.0	9.0	4.0
53. NAMIBIA	3.50	3.0	2.5	3.0	6.0	5.5
54. DJIBOUTI	3.45	6.0	7.0	5.0	2.0	4.0
55. TUNISIA	3.40	4.0	5.0	3.5	1.0	3.5
56. UNITED KINGDOM*	3.35	3.5	4.0	3.5	2.5	2.0
56. ESWATINI	3.35	4.0	3.0	4.0	2.0	2.0
58. BOTSWANA	3.30	3.5	2.0	3.5	3.0	5.0
59. COMOROS	3.10	5.0	3.5	2.5	3.0	6.0
60. LESOTHO	3.05	3.0	2.5	5.5	1.0	3.0
60. AUSTRALIA*	3.05	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	3.5
60. SINGAPORE*	3.05	5.0	2.5	1.0	2.5	5.5
63. CANADA*	2.60	2.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	3.0
63. SWEDEN*	2.60	2.0	4.5	2.0	2.0	2.0
65. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	2.00	1.5	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.0

* Global benchmark countries used in the research

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL MARKETS (AVERAGE)	6. NON- RENEWABLE RESOURCE CRIMES	7. HEROIN TRADE	8. COCAINE TRADE	9. CANNABIS TRADE	10. SYNTHETIC DRUGS TRADE
32. SOMALIA	4.80	3.0	3.0	1.5	3.0	2.0
33. ZIMBABWE	4.70	8.0	4.0	2.5	4.5	5.0
34. EGYPT	4.65	3.0	5.5	1.5	6.5	7.0
35. ZAMBIA	4.60	5.5	4.0	3.0	5.0	3.0
36. ANGOLA	4.55	8.5	2.5	4.0	3.5	3.0
37. MOROCCO	4.50	3.0	2.5	6.0	9.0	6.0
38. REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	4.45	3.0	3.5	5.0	4.0	2.0
38. SENEGAL	4.45	4.5	2.5	3.5	5.0	2.5
40. ETHIOPIA	4.40	4.0	3.0	4.0	5.0	3.0
40. BURUNDI	4.40	5.0	5.0	1.5	4.0	2.5
42. GUINEA-BISSAU	4.35	1.0	5.0	7.0	5.0	2.0
43. ALGERIA	4.30	7.0	2.5	3.5	6.0	4.0
44. MALAWI	4.00	4.0	4.0	2.5	6.0	1.5
45. MAURITIUS	3.95	3.0	8.0	2.5	5.5	7.0
46. ERITREA	3.90	3.0	3.0	1.5	4.0	1.5
47. JAPAN*	3.80	1.0	2.0	3.0	3.0	6.0
47. RWANDA	3.80	6.0	3.0	1.5	4.0	3.0
49. MAURITANIA	3.70	3.0	1.5	5.0	6.0	2.5
50. SEYCHELLES	3.60	1.0	6.5	2.5	3.0	4.0
50. CABO VERDE	3.60	1.0	4.5	6.5	5.0	4.5
52. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.55	6.0	1.5	1.0	3.5	1.0
53. NAMIBIA	3.50	4.5	3.0	2.0	2.5	3.0
54. DJIBOUTI	3.45	1.0	2.5	1.5	4.0	1.5
55. TUNISIA	3.40	4.0	2.0	2.0	5.0	4.0
56. UNITED KINGDOM*	3.35	1.0	4.5	4.5	3.0	5.0
56. ESWATINI	3.35	3.0	4.0	3.0	6.0	2.5
58. BOTSWANA	3.30	1.5	3.5	3.5	4.0	3.5
59. COMOROS	3.10	1.0	5.0	1.5	2.0	1.5
60. LESOTHO	3.05	5.0	2.5	1.5	3.5	3.0
60. AUSTRALIA*	3.05	1.0	3.5	3.5	4.0	6.0
60. SINGAPORE*	3.05	1.5	3.0	3.0	2.0	4.5
63. CANADA*	2.60	1.0	3.0	2.5	3.0	4.5
63. SWEDEN*	2.60	1.0	2.5	3.0	3.5	3.5
65. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	2.00	1.0	1.5	1.5	3.0	1.5

Criminal actor scores

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	1. MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	2. CRIMINAL NETWORKS	3. STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	4. FOREIGN CRIMINAL ACTORS
1. COLOMBIA*	8.50	10.0	10.0	8.0	6.0
2. DEM. REP. OF CONGO	8.13	8.5	8.0	8.0	8.0
3. SOMALIA	8.00	8.5	7.5	9.0	7.0
4. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	7.88	8.5	8.0	7.5	7.5
5. NIGERIA	7.75	6.0	9.5	8.0	7.5
5. SOUTH SUDAN	7.75	6.5	8.0	8.5	8.0
7. SOUTH AFRICA	7.13	6.5	7.0	7.5	7.5
8. SUDAN	7.00	5.0	7.5	8.0	7.5
9. UGANDA	6.75	5.5	6.5	7.5	7.5
10. LIBYA	6.63	8.0	6.5	8.0	4.0
10. KENYA	6.63	6.0	7.0	7.5	6.0
10. CHAD	6.63	8.0	6.5	7.0	5.0
13. MEXICO*	6.50	9.0	10.0	4.0	3.0
13. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	6.50	3.0	7.5	8.0	7.5
13. MALI	6.50	5.5	7.5	9.0	4.0
16. PHILIPPINES*	6.38	8.0	4.5	7.0	6.0
16. MOZAMBIQUE	6.38	3.5	6.5	8.0	7.5
18. ALBANIA*	6.13	8.0	7.0	7.0	2.5
18. NIGER	6.13	2.0	7.0	8.5	7.0
18. TOGO	6.13	1.0	7.5	8.0	8.0
18. ZIMBABWE	6.13	3.5	7.5	8.5	5.0
22. CAMEROON	6.00	3.5	7.5	8.0	5.0
23. EL SALVADOR*	5.88	10.0	5.5	5.0	3.0
24. MADAGASCAR	5.75	4.0	3.5	7.5	8.0
25. GUINEA	5.63	1.5	5.5	8.5	7.0
25. EGYPT	5.63	3.0	6.0	7.0	6.5
25. GUINEA-BISSAU	5.63	1.5	7.5	7.5	6.0
28. MAURITANIA	5.50	6.0	4.0	7.0	5.0
29. MOROCCO	5.25	1.0	6.5	7.5	6.0
29. REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	5.25	3.0	6.0	8.0	4.0
31. ZAMBIA	5.13	3.0	4.5	6.0	7.0

* Global benchmark countries used in the research

COUNTRY	CRIMINAL ACTORS (AVERAGE)	1. MAFIA-STYLE GROUPS	2. CRIMINAL NETWORKS	3. STATE-EMBEDDED ACTORS	4. FOREIGN CRIMINAL ACTORS
31. UNITED KINGDOM*	5.13	4.0	6.5	2.0	8.0
33. TANZANIA	5.00	3.0	6.0	5.5	5.5
33. SIERRA LEONE	5.00	1.0	5.5	7.0	6.5
33. BURKINA FASO	5.00	4.5	5.0	6.5	4.0
33. ANGOLA	5.00	1.0	5.5	8.5	5.0
37. SENEGAL	4.75	3.5	5.5	4.0	6.0
37. ETHIOPIA	4.75	2.0	6.5	3.5	7.0
39. GHANA	4.63	1.0	6.0	6.5	5.0
39. ERITREA	4.63	1.0	5.5	9.5	2.5
41. BENIN	4.50	1.0	6.5	4.5	6.0
41. GABON	4.50	1.0	3.5	7.5	6.0
43. BURUNDI	4.38	1.5	3.5	8.5	4.0
43. MAURITIUS	4.38	2.0	5.5	6.0	4.0
43. JAPAN*	4.38	7.0	2.5	3.0	5.0
43. COMOROS	4.38	1.0	4.5	6.0	6.0
47. SEYCHELLES	4.25	2.0	4.5	4.0	6.5
47. LESOTHO	4.25	1.0	5.0	6.0	5.0
49. LIBERIA	4.13	1.0	5.5	6.0	4.0
49. GAMBIA	4.13	1.0	6.5	7.0	2.0
49. ALGERIA	4.13	1.0	5.5	6.5	3.5
49. NAMIBIA	4.13	2.5	4.5	3.5	6.0
53. DJIBOUTI	4.00	1.5	4.5	4.0	6.0
54. CABO VERDE	3.88	3.0	3.5	2.0	7.0
54. AUSTRALIA*	3.88	4.0	5.5	1.0	5.0
56. MALAWI	3.75	2.0	3.5	4.5	5.0
57. ESWATINI	3.63	2.0	5.5	3.0	4.0
58. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	3.50	1.0	2.5	9.0	1.5
59. BOTSWANA	3.38	1.0	4.5	3.0	5.0
59. CANADA*	3.38	4.0	2.5	2.0	5.0
59. SWEDEN*	3.38	4.0	3.5	2.0	4.0
62. TUNISIA	3.13	1.0	3.5	5.0	3.0
63. RWANDA	2.88	1.0	2.5	5.0	3.0
64. SINGAPORE*	2.63	3.0	2.5	1.0	4.0
65. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	1.75	1.0	2.5	1.0	2.5

Resilience scores

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	1. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	2. GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	4. NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	5. JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	6. LAW ENFORCEMENT
1. CANADA*	8.79	9.0	9.0	10.0	8.5	7.5	9.0
2. UNITED KINGDOM*	8.75	9.0	9.0	9.5	8.5	8.5	9.0
3. AUSTRALIA*	8.54	9.0	9.0	9.0	8.5	9.0	9.0
4. SWEDEN*	7.96	8.0	9.0	9.5	7.0	8.0	8.0
4. SINGAPORE*	7.96	7.0	9.0	9.5	7.5	9.0	9.0
6. JAPAN*	7.92	6.0	8.0	9.0	8.5	9.0	8.5
7. CABO VERDE	6.54	7.5	6.5	8.0	7.0	7.0	7.0
8. MAURITIUS	6.42	6.5	6.5	6.0	6.0	7.0	7.0
9. MOROCCO	6.33	5.5	6.0	7.0	7.0	7.0	7.5
10. BOTSWANA	6.25	7.0	6.0	7.5	7.0	6.5	6.5
11. SENEGAL	6.04	6.0	5.0	6.0	6.5	6.0	7.0
12. ETHIOPIA	6.00	6.5	6.5	7.0	7.0	5.0	6.0
13. RWANDA	5.75	6.5	6.0	6.0	6.5	5.0	7.0
14. NIGERIA	5.67	5.5	5.5	6.5	8.0	4.0	6.0
15. COLOMBIA*	5.58	6.0	5.0	9.0	6.5	5.0	8.0
15. SOUTH AFRICA	5.58	6.0	6.5	5.5	6.5	6.0	6.0
17. ALBANIA*	5.46	5.5	6.0	7.0	6.0	6.5	6.0
17. GHANA	5.46	6.0	5.0	6.0	5.5	5.0	6.0
19. SEYCHELLES	5.38	6.5	6.5	6.0	6.0	5.5	7.0
20. TUNISIA	5.29	7.0	6.5	4.5	6.5	4.5	4.5
21. KENYA	5.04	5.5	4.0	6.5	7.0	5.0	6.0
21. NAMIBIA	5.04	5.5	6.0	6.5	6.0	4.5	4.5
23. PHILIPPINES*	4.83	3.0	3.0	5.5	8.5	6.0	2.0
24. ALGERIA	4.75	6.5	2.5	4.0	7.0	4.0	7.0
25. DJIBOUTI	4.67	4.0	3.0	7.5	5.5	4.0	5.0
26. GAMBIA	4.63	4.0	6.0	4.0	4.5	4.5	5.0
27. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	4.54	6.0	4.0	6.0	4.5	6.0	4.0
28. MALAWI	4.38	5.0	4.5	4.5	5.5	5.0	4.5
29. MEXICO*	4.33	3.0	4.5	7.5	6.0	4.0	5.0
29. ANGOLA	4.33	6.0	4.5	5.5	5.5	3.5	5.0
29. BENIN	4.33	6.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	3.0	4.0

* Global benchmark countries used in the research

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	7. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	8. ANTI-MONEY- LAUNDERING SYSTEMS	9. ECONOMIC REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT	10. VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	11. PREVENTION	12. NON-STATE ACTORS
1. CANADA*	8.79	9.0	8.0	10.0	7.5	8.0	10.0
2. UNITED KINGDOM*	8.75	9.0	7.5	10.0	8.0	8.0	9.0
3. AUSTRALIA*	8.54	9.0	8.0	8.0	8.0	7.0	9.0
4. SWEDEN*	7.96	9.0	7.5	8.0	7.0	6.0	8.5
4. SINGAPORE*	7.96	8.0	8.5	8.0	7.0	9.0	4.0
6. JAPAN*	7.92	9.0	8.0	8.0	7.0	6.0	8.0
7. CABO VERDE	6.54	7.5	6.5	6.0	3.5	6.0	6.0
8. MAURITIUS	6.42	7.0	6.0	7.0	6.0	5.0	7.0
9. MOROCCO	6.33	6.5	6.0	5.5	6.0	6.0	6.0
10. BOTSWANA	6.25	6.5	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.0	6.5
11. SENEGAL	6.04	6.5	6.5	6.0	5.0	5.0	7.0
12. ETHIOPIA	6.00	7.0	7.0	6.0	4.0	4.5	5.5
13. RWANDA	5.75	7.5	6.0	6.0	5.5	5.0	2.0
14. NIGERIA	5.67	5.0	6.0	6.0	4.0	5.0	6.5
15. COLOMBIA*	5.58	3.0	7.0	5.0	3.5	3.0	6.0
15. SOUTH AFRICA	5.58	6.0	6.0	6.5	3.0	2.0	7.0
17. ALBANIA*	5.46	5.5	4.5	4.0	6.5	5.0	3.0
17. GHANA	5.46	6.0	6.0	6.5	3.0	4.0	6.5
19. SEYCHELLES	5.38	4.5	3.5	3.5	4.0	5.5	6.0
20. TUNISIA	5.29	5.5	5.0	5.5	5.0	2.0	7.0
21. KENYA	5.04	5.0	5.5	5.5	2.0	1.5	7.0
21. NAMIBIA	5.04	3.5	4.5	6.5	4.0	3.0	6.0
23. PHILIPPINES*	4.83	5.0	7.0	6.0	5.0	4.0	3.0
24. ALGERIA	4.75	7.5	3.0	5.0	3.0	4.0	3.5
25. DJIBOUTI	4.67	6.0	6.0	6.0	2.0	4.0	3.0
26. GAMBIA	4.63	6.0	5.0	5.0	2.5	3.0	6.0
27. CÔTE D'IVOIRE	4.54	4.5	4.0	5.0	3.5	3.0	4.0
28. MALAWI	4.38	2.5	6.0	4.0	2.0	3.0	6.0
29. MEXICO*	4.33	3.0	4.0	5.0	3.0	3.0	4.0
29. ANGOLA	4.33	6.0	4.0	4.0	2.0	3.0	3.0
29. BENIN	4.33	4.0	5.5	4.0	3.0	2.5	7.0

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	1. POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE	2. GOVERNMENT TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY	3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION	4. NATIONAL POLICIES AND LAWS	5. JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND DETENTION	6. LAW ENFORCEMENT
32. EL SALVADOR*	4.25	2.5	5.5	5.0	4.5	5.0	4.0
33. TANZANIA	4.13	6.5	3.0	4.0	5.5	5.0	5.0
34. TOGO	4.04	3.0	2.5	6.5	4.5	3.5	4.0
35. EGYPT	3.96	5.0	3.0	3.0	4.5	5.0	5.0
35. ZAMBIA	3.96	4.5	3.0	4.5	6.5	5.0	4.5
37. BURKINA FASO	3.88	4.0	4.0	5.5	5.5	3.5	3.5
38. LIBERIA	3.83	4.5	3.0	5.5	4.5	3.5	4.0
39. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	3.79	4.0	3.0	6.0	6.5	5.0	5.0
40. UGANDA	3.63	4.0	2.0	4.5	3.5	3.5	3.0
41. LESOTHO	3.58	4.0	3.5	5.0	5.5	3.0	3.0
42. NIGER	3.54	4.0	4.0	5.0	5.5	2.5	4.5
43. ZIMBABWE	3.33	2.5	2.0	3.0	3.5	2.5	3.5
43. CAMEROON	3.33	2.5	2.0	5.0	4.5	3.0	4.0
43. SIERRA LEONE	3.33	3.0	2.5	4.0	2.5	3.0	4.0
46. MADAGASCAR	3.25	4.0	2.5	2.0	5.5	3.0	3.0
47. REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	3.08	3.0	1.0	4.0	4.0	2.0	4.0
48. ESWATINI	2.96	3.5	2.5	3.0	4.0	3.0	3.0
49. SUDAN	2.83	3.0	2.0	4.0	6.5	3.5	3.5
49. MOZAMBIQUE	2.83	2.5	2.0	2.0	5.5	2.5	2.0
51. GUINEA	2.75	1.5	3.0	4.0	3.5	3.0	3.0
52. GABON	2.71	2.0	2.0	4.0	3.5	3.0	4.0
53. GUINEA-BISSAU	2.67	2.5	2.0	4.0	4.0	3.0	3.5
53. MAURITANIA	2.67	3.0	2.0	3.5	3.5	2.0	3.0
55. MALI	2.63	1.5	3.0	4.0	2.5	2.5	2.0
56. COMOROS	2.50	2.5	2.0	3.0	2.5	2.0	2.0
57. ERITREA	2.33	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.5	2.0	3.0
58. LIBYA	2.13	1.0	2.5	2.5	2.0	2.5	4.0
59. CHAD	2.04	3.0	2.0	2.5	2.5	2.0	1.5
59. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	2.04	1.5	1.0	2.0	5.5	2.0	2.0
61. DEM. REP. OF CONGO	1.96	1.0	1.5	2.0	3.5	2.0	1.0
62. BURUNDI	1.88	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.5	2.5	1.5
63. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1.50	1.5	1.5	4.0	1.5	1.0	1.0
63. SOUTH SUDAN	1.50	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.0	2.5	1.0
65. SOMALIA	1.42	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.5	1.0

* Global benchmark countries used in the research

COUNTRY	RESILIENCE (AVERAGE)	7. TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY	8. ANTI-MONEY- LAUNDERING SYSTEMS	9. ECONOMIC REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT	10. VICTIM AND WITNESS SUPPORT	11. PREVENTION	12. NON-STATE ACTORS
32. EL SALVADOR*	4.25	5.5	5.0	1.5	5.0	3.5	4.0
33. TANZANIA	4.13	4.5	5.5	4.5	1.0	3.0	2.0
34. TOGO	4.04	4.0	3.0	4.5	4.5	4.0	4.5
35. EGYPT	3.96	6.0	4.5	4.5	2.0	2.5	2.5
35. ZAMBIA	3.96	3.5	2.0	5.0	2.0	2.0	5.0
37. BURKINA FASO	3.88	4.0	3.0	3.0	2.5	2.0	6.0
38. LIBERIA	3.83	4.0	3.5	4.0	1.0	2.5	6.0
39. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE	3.79	4.0	3.0	3.0	1.0	1.0	4.0
40. UGANDA	3.63	4.5	3.0	3.5	3.0	4.0	5.0
41. LESOTHO	3.58	2.5	5.0	3.0	2.5	2.0	4.0
42. NIGER	3.54	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.0	2.0	4.0
43. ZIMBABWE	3.33	6.0	5.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	6.0
43. CAMEROON	3.33	3.0	3.5	3.0	2.5	2.0	5.0
43. SIERRA LEONE	3.33	4.0	3.0	3.0	2.5	3.0	5.5
46. MADAGASCAR	3.25	4.0	4.5	3.0	1.0	3.0	3.5
47. REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO	3.08	3.0	4.0	4.0	2.0	3.0	3.0
48. ESWATINI	2.96	3.5	4.0	2.0	2.5	2.0	2.5
49. SUDAN	2.83	2.0	4.0	2.5	1.0	1.0	1.0
49. MOZAMBIQUE	2.83	5.0	2.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	3.5
51. GUINEA	2.75	3.0	3.0	3.0	1.5	1.5	3.0
52. GABON	2.71	4.5	2.0	2.0	1.0	2.0	2.5
53. GUINEA-BISSAU	2.67	3.0	2.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	4.0
53. MAURITANIA	2.67	4.0	3.0	3.0	1.0	2.0	2.0
55. MALI	2.63	2.0	2.5	3.0	1.5	2.0	5.0
56. COMOROS	2.50	3.0	4.0	3.0	1.5	1.0	3.5
57. ERITREA	2.33	7.0	3.0	2.5	1.0	2.0	1.0
58. LIBYA	2.13	2.0	1.0	3.0	1.0	1.0	3.0
59. CHAD	2.04	3.5	2.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.5
59. EQUATORIAL GUINEA	2.04	3.5	1.5	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.0
61. DEM. REP. OF CONGO	1.96	2.0	1.5	1.5	2.0	1.5	4.0
62. BURUNDI	1.88	3.0	3.5	2.0	1.5	1.0	1.5
63. CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1.50	1.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.0
63. SOUTH SUDAN	1.50	2.0	1.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	2.5
65. SOMALIA	1.42	1.5	2.0	1.5	1.0	1.0	3.0

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The European Union (EU) has placed security in Africa at the forefront of its international agenda, notably through its Pan-African Programme – the first programme of its kind to centre on development and cooperation, and covering Africa as a whole. One project under the Pan-African Programme is ENACT: Enhancing Africa's capacity to respond more effectively to transnational organised crime. ENACT works to mitigate the impact of transnational organised crime (TOC) in Africa on development, governance, security and the rule of law. It achieves this in two ways: firstly, by building knowledge and offering evidence-based analysis of TOC in Africa, which will inform policy and enhance cooperation at the regional and continental level. Secondly, ENACT builds skills and capacity among key African stakeholders to better respond to transnational organised crime and mitigate its impact.

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